TIMING ISN'T EVERYTHING: THE SUPREME COURT

DECIDES THAT A PRESIDENTIAL CANCELLATION DoEs
INDEED "WALK, SWIM, AND QUACK" LIE A LNE-ITEM
VETO'
The United States Constitution organizes the government into a
tripartite structure according to a separation of powers framework.2
Separation of powers refers to the constitutional distribution of powers horizontally among the legislative,3 executive, and judicial5
branches of the national government.6 While each branch possesses
a degree of political and constitutional independence from the other
two branches, the separation is not pure and complete because the
Constitution contemplates an institutional interdependence among
the three branches. 7 This interbranch symbiosis is captured in the
See City of New York v. Clinton, 985 F. Supp. 168, 179 (D.D.C. 1998).
Judge
Thomas F. Hogan of the district court, rejecting the argument that the Line Item
Veto Act of 1996 (Act) did not confer line-item-veto authority on the President,
quoted the observation of Richard Cardinal Cushing: "'When I see a bird that walks
like a duck and swims like a duck and quacks like a duck, I call that bird a duck.'"
Id (citation omitted); see also infra note 52 and accompanying text discussing the
court's reasoning. The United States Supreme Court ultimately affirmed the judgment of the district court. See Clinton v. City of New York, 118 S.Ct. 2091, 2108
(1998).
2 See JOHN R VILE, A COMPANION TO THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION AND ITS
AMENDMENTS 25 (1993) (noting that "[t]he first three articles, called distributing
clauses, illustrate the doctrine of separation of powers in that each establishes a
separate branch of the central, or national, government"). Separation of powers is
"a doctrine not directly articulated in the [Constitution] but certainly consistent with
its structure." Id.

3

See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (stating that "[a]ll legislative Powers herein
granted
shall be vested in a Congress of the United States..
").
4 See id art. 11, § 1, cl. 1 (stating that "[t]he executive Power
shall be vested in a
President of the United States of America").
5 See id. art. III, § 1 (providing that "[t]he judicial Power of the United
States,
shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress
may6from time to time ordain and establish").
See BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 1365 (6th ed. 1990) ("The governments of states
and the United States are divided into three departments or branches: the legislative, which is empowered to make laws, the executive which is required to carry out
the laws, and the judicial which is charged with interpreting the laws and adjudicat-

ing disputes under the laws.").

See RiCHARD E. NEUSTADT, PRESIDENTIAL POWER AND THE MODERN PRESIDENTS
29
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concept of checks and balances.8 The branches share several powers,
and no single branch obtains exclusive domain over any particular
authority.9
The lawmaking process illustrates perfectly the simultaneous
operation of separation of powers and checks and balances.'0 Article
I of the Constitution formally vests the legislative power in Congress;
the national legislature, therefore, has the lawmaking function within
its separate sphere of authority." Due to checks and balances, however, the enactment of legislation requires the participation of both
the legislative and executive branches. The Presentment Clause' of
(1990) (asserting that the Constitution creates not a separation of powers, but
rather, "a government of separate institutions sharingpowers"); Mistretta v. United
States, 488 U.S. 361, 381 (1989) (stating that "Madison recognized that our constitutional system imposes upon the Branches a degree of overlapping responsibility, a
duty of interdependence as well as independence the absence of which 'would preclude the establishment of a Nation capable of governing itself effectively"')
(quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 121 (1976)); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) (arguing that the Constitution "enjoins upon its branches separateness but interdependence, autonomy but
reciprocity").
See KAREN O'CONNOR & LARRYJ. SABATO, AMERICAN GOVERNMENT: CONTINUrIY
AND CHANGE 55 (1997) (defining checks and balances as "[a] governmental structure that gives each of the three branches of government some degree of oversight
and control over the actions of the others"). Because the Founders feared the concentration of powers, separation of powers and checks and balances "were desirable
to prevent official tyranny and, even more important, to prevent a single segment of
the population, majority or minority, from gaining complete control of the government." J.W. PELTASON, CORWIN & PELTASON'S UNDERSTANDING THE CONSTITUTION 23
(12th ed. 1991).
9 See PELTASON, supra note 8, at 23 (contending that the Constitution
gives each
branch "a voice in the business of the others, and each is made dependent on the
cooperation of the others in order to accomplish its own business. It is through this
blending of powers by politically independent branches that the doctrine of checks
and balances is made effective").
10 See SUSAN WELCH ET AL., UNDERSTANDING AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 33-34 (4th
ed.

1997).

11 See O'CONNOR & SABATO, supra note 8, at 56 ("[The Framers were
careful to
create a system in which lawmaking, law-enforcing, and law-interpreting functions
were assigned to independent branches of government. On the national level (and
in most states), only the legislature has the authority to make laws; the chief executive enforces laws, and the judiciary interprets them").
1 See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 947 (1983) ("It is beyond doubt that lawmaking was a power to be shared by both Houses and the President.").
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7. Clause 2 of the Presentment Clause provides:
Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and
the Senate, shall, before it become a Law, be presented to the President of the United States; If he approve he shall sign it, but if not he
shall return it, with his Objections to that House in which it shall have
originated, who shall enter the Objections at large on their Journal,
and proceed to reconsider it.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
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the Constitution, which grants a president legislative powers, mandates that every bill, in order to become law, shall pass both Houses4
of Congress and be presented to the President for signature or veto.'
The lawmaking procedures of the Presentment Clause, bicameral
passage and presentment to the President, quintessentially demonstrate the constitutional doctrine of checks and balances.'
The third branch, the judiciary, ultimately may enter this institutional intermingling by interpreting the enacted law or exercising the
power of judicial review to judge the constitutionality of the legislation, thereby checking the other branches.' 6 Not immune from the
system of checks and balances, the judicial power in turn is confined
to "Cases" or "Controversies" under Article 11. 7 The United States
Clause 3 of the Presentment Clause provides:
Every Order, Resolution, or Vote to which the Concurrence of the
Senate and House of Representatives may be necessary (except on a
question of Adjournment) shall be presented to the President of the
United States; and before the Same shall take Effect, shall be approved
by him, or being disapproved by him, shall be repassed by two thirds of
the Senate and House of Representatives, according to the Rules and
Limitations prescribed in the Case of a Bill.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 3.
Clause 2, a president's "how-to guide," contains a "set of directions to the president, carefully explaining executive options for dealing with legislation sent to the
president." RobertJ. Spitzer, The Constitutionalityof the PresidentialLine-Item Veto, 112
POL SC. Q. 261, 276 (1997). Clause 3, by contrast, speaks to Congress, not to the
President. See id. The thrust of Clause 3 is to prevent congressional subterfuge, such
as calling a bill by another term to avoid presentment altogether, to circumvent the
President's role in the lawmaking process. See id. at 276-77.
14 See Harold J. Krent, Separating the Strands inSeparation of Powers Controversies,
74
VA. L. REv. 1253, 1265-66 (1988). The presentment requirement "ensures that the
legislative branch will be accountable for its actions. By requiring the procedural
step of presentment to the President, the framers circumscribed Congress's ability to
pass laws that would encroach on the coordinate branches of government and harm
the public at large." Id. at 1266; see Chadha, 462 U.S. at 951 (finding that "[t]he
President's participation in the legislative process was to protect the Executive
Branch from Congress and to protect the whole people from improvident laws").
15 See VILE, supra note 2, at 39 (noting that Article I, section 7, clause 2, "comes as
close as any provision to demonstrating the founders' commitment to the doctrine
of checks and balances").
16 See LARRY BERMAN & BRUCE ALLEN MURPHY, APPROACHING DEMOCRACY
68 (2nd
ed. 1999). Judicial review is the "[p]ower of courts to review decisions of another
department or level of government." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 849 (6th ed. 1990).
Judicial review, not specifically mentioned in the Constitution, found first assertion
in ChiefJustice John Marshall's famous opinion in Marbuiy v. Madison. See Marbury
v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177-78 (1803). Through the power of judicial
review, "the Court most dramatically asserts its authority to determine what the Constitution means." John Brigham, JudicialReview, in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 464, 464 (Kermit L. Hall ed., 1992).
17 See U.S CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1:
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising
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Supreme Court has derived from this constitutional confinement of
Article III a series of self-imposed 'justiciability" doctrines, perhaps
the most significant limitations on the power of the federal judiciary.'8 These justiciability doctrines are closely connected to the concept of separation of powers.'9 One justiciability doctrine is that a
under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties
made, or which shall be made, under their authority; - to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls; - to all
Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction; - to Controversies to
which the United States shall be a Party, - to Controversies between
two or more States; - between a State and Citizens of another State;
between Citizens of different States; - between Citizens of the
same State claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or
Subjects.
Id. The words "Cases" and "Controversies" constitute "the origin of a body of law
that imposes important restraints on the power of the federal judiciary." James B.
Stoneking, Cases and Controversies, in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 16, at 129. Under Article III, the federal judiciary
"may consider only issues that are presented in an adversary context. They may not
answer merely hypothetical or abstract questions: their power is limited by law to
questions that arise out of an actual dispute." Id. In addition to its relationship to
the power of courts, the cases-or-controversies requirement also relates to the separation of powers: "The framers constructed a government comprising three distinct
branches - legislative, executive, and judicial - and made each branch dominant
in its own sphere. Federal courts therefore approach cases that involve conflicts
within or between branches cautiously." Id Chief Justice Warren for the Court
found that Article III limited the power of the federal judiciary "to those disputes
which confine federal courts to a role consistent with a system of separated powers
and which are traditionally thought to be capable of resolution through the judicial
process." Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 97 (1968).
18 See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
PRINCIPLES AND POuCIES 46
(1997) (asserting that "[t ] he justiciability doctrines determine which matters federal
courts can hear and decide and which must be dismissed"). Justiciability actually is
.a conceptual umbrella covering several related doctrines or problems" such as the
prohibitions against advisory opinions and political questions, standing, mootness,
and ripeness. William M. Wiecek, Justiciability, in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 16, at 478. The justiciability doctrines are judicial creations of the United States Supreme Court. See CHEMERINSKY,

supra at 46 ("Neither the text of the Constitution, nor the framers in drafting the
document, expressly mentioned any of these limitations on the judicial power.").
Indeed, the doctrines are creations "of the twentieth century - in particular, of efforts by Justices Brandeis, Frankfurter, and others seeking to immunize what they
considered to be progressive government, and especially administrative agencies,
from judicial review." GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 90 (3d ed.
1996).
19 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 18, at 47. Justiciability relates to the separation
of
powers in that "[t ] he justiciability doctrines define the judicial role; they determine
when it is appropriate for the federal courts to review a matter and when it is necessary to defer to the other branches of government." Id at 48. The justiciability doctrines that elaborate the cases-or-controversies requirement of Article III are
"'founded in concern about the proper - and properly limited - role of the courts
in a democratic society.'" Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984) (quoting Warth
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party must have standing"° in order to invoke the power of the federal
courts.2' A central component of the standing doctrine is that a
plaintiff must suffer an "injury-in-fact,"' a principle tied to separation
of powers."
v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975)). These doctrines serve other policies including
the conservation of judicial resources, the improvement of judicial decisionmaking,
and the promotion of fairness. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 18, at 48.
20 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 18, at 58. Federal courts utilize the doctrine of
standing "to determine if a party is sufficiently affected so as to insure that a justiciable controversy is presented to the court .... " BLACK'S LAW DICIONARY 1405 (6th
ed. 1990). The essence of "the question of standing is whether the litigant is entitled
to have the court decide the merits of the dispute or of particular issues." Warth, 422
U.S. at 498. Recognizing some incoherence of the law of standing, the Court itself
has admitted: "We need not mince words when we say that the concept of 'Art. III
standing' has not been defined with complete consistency in all of the various cases
decided by this Court...." Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for
Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 475 (1982). Nevertheless, the
Court has determined that the "core component" of the standing requirement is
that "[a] plaintiff must allege personal injury, fairly traceable to the defendant's allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to be redressed by the requested relief." Allen,
468 U.S. at 751 (citing Valley Forge Christian College, 454 U.S. at 472). In addition to
the constitutional elements of standing, the Court has identified several prudential
standing principles. See CHEMPERINSKY, supra note 18, at 58 (referring to the limits
that parties may not raise claims of third parties, that a taxpayer may not file suit
with regard to a common and generalized grievance, and that a plaintiff must raise a
claim falling within a statutory zone of interests). While Congress may not override
the constitutional restrictions to standing, that institution may statutorily eliminate
the prudential limitations. See id.
See Mark V. Tushnet, Standing to Sue, in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 16, at 819 ("In its simplest form,

standing identifies who may bring claims that some government action violates the
Constitution. Other justiciability doctrines identify what claims may be brought (the
political questions doctrine) and when they may be brought (doctrines of mootness
and ripeness)."). The standing doctrine serves separation of powers principles because the doctrine restricts the federal judiciary's exercise of judicial review. See
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 18, at 56 (noting that, "by restricting who may sue in federal court, standing limits what matters the judiciary will address and minimizes judicial review of the actions of the other branches of government"). The Court has
distilled the doctrine down to the notion that Article III standing "is built on a single
basic idea - the idea of separation of powers." Allen, 468 U.S. at 752. See generally
Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 881 (1983) (defining standing in terms of its relationship
to the separation of powers).
See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). Defining the
contours of the standard, the Court in Lujan deemed an injury-in-fact an "invasion
of a legally protected interest." Id. That interest must be "concrete and particularized." Id. That interest must also be "'actual or imminent,' not 'conjectural' or
'hypothetical."' Id. (quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990)). For a
criticism of the Lujan standard for injury-in-fact, see Cass R. Sunstein, What's Standing After Lujan ?: Of Citizen Suits, "Injuries," and Article II, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 166
(1992) (contending that the Court's injury-in-fact requirement lacks historical and
textual support and that the correct test for standing is whether the federal or state
law or the Constitution confer on a plaintiff a "cause of action"). See also STONE ET
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Many authorities are convinced that Congress has vitiated the effectiveness of the presidential veto, an essential check,"' and, therefore, has created an imbalance of power between the legislative and
executive branches.2 ' Seeking to revive checks and balances to the
supra note 18, at 121 (criticizing the Court for failing to explain the decisional
criteria by which the Court characterizes an injury for purposes of standing);
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 18, at 72 (discussing the importance of the Court's characterization of the relevant injury for the Court's analysis of the requirements of causation and redressability); Tushnet, supra note 21, at 820 ("The injury-in-fact requirement has been criticized for reviving the problem that standing and the merits tend
to collapse into each other.").
23 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 18, at 59 (asserting that injury-in-fact
"is viewed as
advancing the values underlying the standing and justiciability doctrines .... The
judicial role in the system of separation of powers is to prevent or redress particular
injuries").
24 SeeJudith A. Best, The Item Veto: Would the Founders Approve?,
14 PRESIDENTIAL
STUD. Q. 183, 187 (1984) ("No clearer example of the checks and balances is to be
found in the Constitution than the veto power.").
25 See Diane-Michelle Krasnow, The Imbalance
of Power and the PresidentialVeto: A
Casefor the Item Veto, 14 HARV.J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 583, 584 (1991) ("Due to the erosion
of the presidential impoundment power and changes in the way Congress now legislates, the veto power no longer adequately serves to maintain [the] balance."). A
key argument is that Congress has undermined the traditional presidential veto
power through its use of omnibus bills and other practices. See Russell M. Ross &
Fred Schwengel, An Item Veto for the President?, 12 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 66, 77
(1983) (asserting that Congress negates "the system of checks and balances which is
a basic principle of our system of government" by lumping together unrelated appropriations into one large measure, attaching riders to legislation, and considering
substantial appropriations bills at the end of congressional sessions). An omnibus
bill is "[a] legislative bill including in one act various separate and distinct matters,
and frequently one joining a number of different subjects in one measure in such a
way as to compel the executive authority to accept provisions which he does not approve or else defeat the whole enactment." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1087 (6th ed.
1990). President Clinton, in signing the Line Item Veto Act of 1996, specifically justified the Act by stating that "[t]he modern congressional practice of presenting the
President with omnibus legislation reduces the President's ability to play the role in
enacting laws that the Constitution intended." William J. Clinton, Statement on
Signing the Line Item Veto Act, 1 PUB. PAPERS 559 (April 9, 1996). See Gordon
Crovitz, The Line-Item Veto: The Best Response Wen CongressPasses One Spending "Bill" a
Year, 18 PEPP. L. REv. 43, 43 (1990) (describing the President's alternatives of signing an omnibus spending bill or vetoing all spending as a "Hobson's choice"); see
also Krasnow, supra, at 584 (arguing that "the President is frequently coerced into
signing bills that contain objectionable provisions, at peril of risking the very operation of government"). But see Neal E. Devins, In Search of the Lost Chord: Reflections on
the 1996 Item Veto Act, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 1605, 1619 (1997) (arguing that a
president's standard veto power provides him sufficient potency, if sufficient presidential energy is present, to contend effectively in bargaining with Congress over
omnibus legislation).
A companion argument relates to the congressional penchant for attaching riders and non-germane amendments to legislation, especially appropriations bills. See
Best, supra note 24, at 187 (asserting that Congress's frequent attachment of riders
and non-germane amendments to legislation eviscerates the president's existing veto
powers because presidents confront the unfortunate choice of either vetoing the enAL.,
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26
lawmaking process, proponents of the presidential line-item veto

have argued that the mechanism could resurrect the eviscerated veto
power." Resurgent veto power appeared necessary to restore to
tire bill or acceding to riders by signing an otherwise-desired bill). A rider is "[a]
provision that might not have much chance to pass on its own merits but is attached
to another bill, often unrelated, to secure its legislative passage." JAMES MACGREGOR
BURNS ET AL., GOVERNMENT BY THE PEOPLE G-7 (17th ed. 1998). Congress has faulted
its own practices, noting:
Each year wasteful and parochial projects - unlikely to pass on their
own merits - are tucked into omnibus bills.... They may be nothing
more than extraneous and indefensible riders that hope to make it to
safety in the company of a larger bill. They are added routinely as a
part of the price for getting a bill out of committee or passing it on the
floor.
S. REP. No. 104-13, at 2 (1996). Because Congress attaches a rider to a bill that a
president must sign or veto in its entirety, the Congress can force a president to accept a rider that he might be inclined otherwise to veto. See Clinton, Remarks on
Signing the Line Item Veto Act, supra, at 557 (stating that "as vital bills move
through Congress, they can become clogged with items that would never pass on
their own. Presidents often have no choice but to sign these bills because of their
main purpose"). But see Paul R. Q. Wolfson, Note, Is a PresidentialItem Veto Constitutional?, 96 YALE L.J. 838, 840 (1987) (contending that support for the line-item veto
is based on the flawed premise that the Framers of the Constitution did not contemplate the possibility of omnibus bills or riders and thus would endorse the concept of
such a veto to correct the unexpected institutional imbalance of power).
26 See BURNs ET AL., supra note 25, at G-4 (defining a line-item
veto as the
"[a]uthority of the president or the governor of a state to veto parts of a legislative
bill without having to veto the entire bill"). Notwithstanding the general uniformity
among definitions, different types of line-item vetoes actually exist or are theoretically possible. SeeJ. Gregory Sidak & Thomas A. Smith, Four Faces of the Item Veto: A
Reply to Tribe and Kurland, 84 Nw. U. L. REV. 437, 446-60 (1990) (delineating four
types of line-item vetoes, all of which permit the President, prior to signing a bill, to
line-out portions).
See Krasnow, supra note 25, at 607 (asserting that the line-item veto "would enable the President to reassert his authority and counteract the recent encroachment
by Congress"). A line-item veto would restore the President's full veto power, and
thus, "the constitutionally-provided system of checks and balances would be reestablished."
Ross & Schwengel, supra note 25, at 77. A line-item veto for the President "would, in
large measure, do little more than restore to the President his rightful power and
take from Congress powers which it has usurped for itself." Id. But see Louis Fisher
& Neal Devins, How Successfully Can the States' Item Veto be Transferred to the President?,
75 GEO. L.J. 159, 192 (1986) (arguing that "[allthough the President's general veto
power has been weakened to some extent by omnibus appropriations bills, the
Founders would be surprised by the powers that have accrued to the contemporary
President"); Robert J. Spitzer, The Item Veto Reconsidered, 15 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q.
611, 612 (1985) (arguing that the line-item veto would upset the constitutional balance between Congress and the President and "would only accelerate the centurylong trend toward executive dominance - nay, supremacy - in its dealings with the
legislature"); Richard A. Riggs, Note, Separation of Powers: CongressionalRiders and the
Veto Power,6 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 735, 759 (1972) (contending that a line-item veto
would violate the separation of powers because "the President would be placed in a
position to supplant Congress to an even greater degree in the legislative function,
and the general power of the executive branch would be increased at the expense of
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Washington a fiscal discipline" that seemed severely lacking as federal budget deficits mushroomed in the 1980s.2
Congress").
See Clinton, Remarks on Signing the Line Item Veto Act, supra note 25, at 556
"For years, Presidents of both parties have pounded this very desk in frustration at
having to sign necessary legislation that contained special interest boondoggles, tax
loopholes, and pure pork."). A core argument for the line-item veto is that a president could restore greater fiscal responsibility to the areas of the budget and appropriations by killing constituency-driven "pork-barrel" spending items passed by a legislature unable to resist wasteful spending. See S. REP. No. 104-13, at 2 (1996)
(noting that the purpose of the new presidential power was "to confront the serious
problem of pork-barrel spending"). The district court in City of New York v. Clinton
also voiced the view that Congress passed the Act because that institution was incapable of controlling "its voracious appetite for 'pork .... '" 985 F. Supp. 168, 170
(D.D.C. 1998). "Pork-barrel" is legislation "designed to create special benefits for a
member's district, such as bridges, highways, dams, and military installations, all of
which translate into jobs and money for the local economy and improve reelection
chances for the incumbent." BERMAN & MURPHY, supra note 16, at 645. This vision
of president as enforcer of fiscal discipline assumes that a president uniquely serves
a diffuse national interest as opposed to the congressional tendency to serve parochial special interests or constituency-based local interests. See Thomas 0. Sargentich, The Futureof the Item Veto, 83 IOWA L. REv. 79, 119 (conceiving of the "stripped
down" argument as imagining "the President as a white knight who rescues the body
politic from the wasteful, selfish designs of legislators who woo special interests").
But see Nelson W. Posby, Congress-BashingforBeginners, 100 PUB. INTEREST 15, 18-19
(1990) (asserting that a line-item veto would weaken Congress, encourage legislative
irresponsibility, reduce congressional incentives to acquire knowledge, trivialize the
legislative output of Congress, and diminish members' capacity to craft legislation
independent of the executive); Spitzer, supra note 27, at 614-15 (contending that
the line-item veto would not stop pork-barreling or balance the budget because
presidents too share an interest in distributive policymaking).
See Robert J. Spitzer, The Item Veto Dispute and the Secular Crisis of the Presidency,
28 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 799, 801 (1998) (remarking that "the political forces supporting an item veto were animated in large part by the desire to find some way to
lower the federal deficit that ballooned during the Reagan and Bush administrations"). In reciting the need for the Act, Congress stated:
The American people consistently cite run-away federal spending
and a rising national debt as among the top issues of national concern.
Over the past fifteen years alone, the national debt of the United
States has quintupled. From 1789 through 1981, our total national
debt amounted to $1 trillion. Yet today, just fifteen years later, that
debt exceeds $5 trillion, and without significant reforms an additional
$1 trillion will be added over the next four years. This astonishing
growth in federal debt has fueled public support for measures to ensure greater fiscal accountability in Washington.
This legislation ... moves to meet that demand by enhancing the President's ability to eliminate wasteful federal spending and to cancel special tax
breaks.
H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-491, at 15 (1996).
Proponents of the Act envisioned the President "as nonpartisan deficit reduction czar .... " Devins, supra note 25, at 1629. Contrary to the predictions of proponents, analysts cited the inherent incapacity of the Act to contribute meaningfully
to deficit reduction because the President's newly won authority could not reach
mandatory spending and many discretionary spending programs remained politi-
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Finally securing the line-item veto authority that presidents had
long sought," President Clinton on April 9, 1996, signed the Line
cally popular. See id. (suggesting that "[c]ongressional appropriations are often
backed by politically potent interests and, as a result, aggressive use of the item veto
may prove too costly"); see also Robert C. Byrd, The Control of the Purse and the Line
Item Veto Act, 35 HARv. J. ON LEGiS. 297, 314-15 (1998) (noting the inefficacy of the
line-item veto for cutting the deficit given that nondiscretionary spending, such as
entitlement spending, and interest on the national debt constitute approximately
two-thirds of the federal government's budget). Further, Congress could creatively
circumvent a possible line-item veto by altering the wording and packaging of vulnerable spending items contained in a bill. See Philip G. Joyce & Robert D. Reischauer, The FederalLine-Item Veto: What Is It and What Will It Do , 57 PUB. ADMIN. REV.
95, 100-01 (1997). During the first budget season in which the line-item veto was
operational, President Clinton canceled items generating 1.9 billion dollars in
spending savings over five years, totaling approximately 0.02 percent of the nine trillion dollars of the expected government spending during the same period. See
GEORGE C. EDWARDS III & STEPHENJ. WAYNE, PRESIDENTIAL LEADERSHIP 361 (5th ed.
1999). President Clinton employed his line-item-veto power "cautiously, sparingly,
and conservatively." See Spitzer, supra, at 800. Such cautious use is attributable to
(1) continuing questions about the Act's constitutionality; (2) efforts by the Clinton
administration, in precarious political positions at times, to avoid unnecessary confrontation and conflict with Congress; and (3) the abating pressures to reduce the
federal budget deficit after the administration and Congress successfully reined in
the deficit during the President's first term. See id, at 800-01.
so See Michael J. Gerhardt, The Bottom Line on the Line-Item Veto Act of 1996, 6
CoRNELLJ.L. & PUB. POLy 233, 235 (1997). With the exceptions of William Howard
Taft and Jimmy Carter, presidents from both parties and of divergent ideologies
have claimed or pursued authority for the exercise of a presidential line-item veto.
See id. President Ulysses S. Grant initially proposed a line-item veto in 1873, and
members of Congress have introduced at least 150 line-item veto bills in subsequent
years. SeeJames I. Alexander, No Place to Stand: The Supreme Court's Refusal to Address
the Merits of Congressional Members' Line-Item Veto Challenge in Raines v. Byrd, 6 J.L. &
POL'Y 653, 655 n.7 (1998) (citation omitted). President Reagan, in his 1984 State of
the Union Address, precipitated the modern debate on the wisdom of granting
presidents line-item-veto authority. See Ronald Reagan, Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union, 1 PUB. PAPERS 89 (Jan. 25, 1984); see
also Michael D. Schagemann, Note, The Implicitly Constitutional Item Veto, 19 OKLA.
CITY U. L. REv. 161, 161-63 (1994) (discussing the advocacy of Presidents Grant,
Reagan, Bush, and Clinton for the line-item veto).
Presidents sought the line-item veto that state executives in 43 states had possessed for some time. See Richard Briffault, The Item Veto in State Courts, 66 TEMP. L.
REV. 1171, 1175-77 (surveying the post-Civil War trend among 43 states to amend
their state constitutions to provide their governors with line-item vetoes). Evaluations of the contributions of gubernatorial line-item vetoes to state fiscal discipline
are sharply divided. Compare Glenn Abney & Thomas P. Lauth, The Line-Item Veto in
the States: An Instrumentfor Fiscal Restraint or an Instrument for Partisanship?,45 PUB.
ADMIN. REv. 372, 374-75 (1985) (finding that legislatures of states in which governors
possess a line-item veto exhibit less fiscal discipline, and that political partisanship
guides the use of the veto), and David C. Nice, The Item Veto and ExpenditureRestraint,
50J. POL. 487, 497 (1988) (finding no significant statistical relationship between fiscal restraint and use of the veto), with W. Mark Crain & James C. Miller III, Budget
Process and Spending Growth, 31 WM, & MARY L. REv. 1021, 1045 (1990) (concluding
that line-item vetoes result in substantial reductions in spending growth). See also
Fisher & Devins, supra note 27, at 159 (surveying the states' experiences with the gu-
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Item Veto Act of 1996 (Act)."' Though confounding earlier predictionss political circumstances converged in 1996 to produce passage
of the Act." While passage of the Act may have maximized the policy
preferences of its proponents, the constitutional viability of the Act
remained uncertain." Critics argued that the procedures contemplated by the Act arguably were constitutionally incompatible with
the lawmaking procedures envisioned by the Presentment Clause."
bernatorial line-item veto).
S, Pub. L. No. 104-130, 110 Stat. 1200 (codified at 2 U.S.CA. §§ 681, 691-692
(1997)).
32 See E. Donald Elliott, Constitutional Conventions and the
Deficit, 1985 DuKE L.J.
1077, 1103 (asserting that "it is not likely that Congress will grant the President's request that he be given a 'line item veto,' because the line-item veto would reduce the
power of individual members of Congress over spending decisions"); Michael B.
Rappaport, The President's Veto and the Constitution,87 Nw. U. L. REV. 735, 737 (1993)
(contending that "realistically, the President will acquire the selective veto only by
finding it in the Constitution"); Gregory Sidak & Thomas A. Smith, Why Did President
Bush Repudiate the -Inherent" Line-Item Veto?, 9 J.L. & POL. 39, 59 (1992) (noting the
"improbability of Congress ever allowing the President to acquire a line-item
veto....").
See Sargentich, supra note 28, at 119. Sargentich points out that the institutional interest of Congress in preserving its own power prerogatives militated against
passage of a line-item veto. See id. at 87. The new Republican majorities in Congress
felt compelled to pass portions of the "Contract with America," of which the lineitem veto was a significant piece. See id. at 119. Responding to apparent public demand for change in the conduct of business in Washington, Republican strategists
devised for party candidates for the House in 1994 a campaign manifesto deemed
the "Contract with America."
See C. LAWRENCE EvANS & WALTER J. OLESZEK,
CONGRESS UNDER FIRE 6 (1997). Republican candidates for the House in 1994 embraced the agenda for change embodied in the Contract with America by making
the structural reform of Congress the centerpiece of their respective campaigns. See
id. Moreover, Republicans were ideologically inclined to seek a restrained federal
government, which the line-item veto represented. See Sargentich, supra note 28, at
119. Bowing to political expedience, Congress recognized it could take political
cover behind the line-item veto by shifting responsibility to the President for any
deficit increase, while alleviating the need for Congress to make difficult budgetary
decisions. See Devins, supra note 25, at 1608. Republican critics charged that Senator Robert Dole, possessing a lock on the Republican nomination for President at
the time, finally broke a bicameral stalemate in Congress over competing line-item
veto bills in March 1996 in order to present voters with a legislative achievement
from a Republican Congress. See EvANs & OLESZEK, supra, at 150-51. Because the
veto became effective only after the election of the next president, the media promoted the notion that the approval of Republican lawmakers in Congress for the Act
was partially contingent upon a delayed date of effectiveness, after which, presumably, a Republican would occupy the White House. See The Line-Item Veto Decision,
WASH. POST, April 14, 1997, at A16; see alsoJoyce & Reischauer, supra note 29, at 9697 (summarizing the intra-institutional political process leading to passage of the Act
within Congress).
See Michael G. Locklar, Comment, Is the 1996 Line-Item Veto Constitutionalt,34
Hous. L. REv. 1161, 1175 (1997).
See Gerhardt, supra note 30, at 237.
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On January 2, 1997, only one day after the Act became effective,
a bipartisan group of lawmakers challenged the Act and thus implicated the jurisdiction of the federal courts.6 The injury-in-fact element of standing assumed added significance for constitutional challenges to the Act after the Court's jurisdictional decision in Raines 3v.
Byrd." Because the Court refused to reach the merits in Raines,
however, the Court deferred deliberation of the incipient constitutional issue of whether the procedures contemplated by the Act
comport with the Presentment Clause.39
Recently, in Clinton v. City of New York,' the Court brought closure to the question of the constitutionality of the Line Item Veto
Act."' The Court held that the appellees had standing, and that the
Act violated the Presentment Clause.0
President Clinton exercised his authority under the Act to cancel4 section 4722(c) of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997" and section
s6 See Raines v. Byrd, 117 S. Ct. 2312, 2315 (1997); see also infra notes 68-73 and
accompanying text (discussing Raines).
s7 117 S. CL 2312, 2317-18 (1997). In Raines, the Court held that the members
of Congress challenging the Act alleged only an "institutional injury" that was insufficiently concrete to confer Article III standing upon them. See id.at 2322; see also
infra notes 68-73 and accompanying text (discussing Raines).
58 See Raines, 117 S. Ct. at 2318 ("In light of [the] overriding and time-honored
concern about keeping the Judiciary's power within its proper constitutional sphere,
we must put aside the natural urge to proceed directly to the merits of this important dispute and to 'settle' it for the sake of convenience and efficiency."); Neal Devins & Michael A. Fitts, The Tiumph of Timing: Raines v. Byrd and the Modern Supreme
Court's Attempt to Control Constitutional Confrontations, 86 GEo. L.J. 351, 360 (1997)
(suggesting that, although the Court seemed to exercise restraint in the case, Raines
actually "is a paean to judicial supremacy" because the Court effectively assured the
nation and Congress of an ultimate ruling on the Act's constitutionality rather than
forcing Congress "to take seriously its duty to interpret the Constitution .. ").
While the Court eschewed issuing a ruling on the merits in Raines, any number of
analysts were not nearly so reluctant in determining that the Act was unconstitutional. See Alexander, supra note 30, at 687; Gerhardt, supra note 30, at 233-34; Lawrence Lessig, Lessonsfrom a Line Item Veto Law, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1659, 1659
(1997); Sargentich, The Future of the Item Veto, supra note 28, at 136-37. But see Locklar, supra note 34, at 1190 (finding the Act constitutional).
39 See Raines, 117 S. Ct. at 2323 (vacating the judgment
of the district court, remanding the case, and instructing the court to dismiss the complaint due to lack of
jurisdiction).
40 118 S. Ct. 2091 (1998).
41 See id.
at 2095 (deeming the Act's procedures violative of the Constitution).
42 See id.
43 The provisions of the Act never use the term "veto," but instead give a president authority to "cancel" certain legislative measures after signing them into law.
See Raines, 117 S. Ct. at 2315. Under the statute, "cancel" or "cancellation" means:
(A) with respect to any dollar amount of discretionary budget
authority, to rescind;
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968 of the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997.4 Two actions were filed"
against federal officials and the President challenging the constitutionality of the cancellations. Plaintiffs in one case were the City of
New York, one hospital, two' hospital associations, and two health
(B) with respect to any item of new direct spending(i) that is budget authority provided by law (other than an
appropriation law), to prevent such budget authority from having legal force or effect;
(ii) that is entitlement authority, to prevent the specific legal obligation of the United States from having legal force or effect; or
(iii) through the food stamp program, to prevent the specific provision of law that results in an increase in budget
authority or outlays for that program from having legal force or
effect; and
(C) with respect to a limited tax benefit, to prevent the specific
provision of law that provides such benefit from having legal force or
effect.
2 U.S.C.A. § 691e(4)(A)-(C) (West 1997).
Pub. L. No. 105-33, 111 Stat. 251 (1997). Section 4722(c) provides:
(c) WAIVER OF CERTAIN PROVIDER TAX PROVISIONS. - Notwithstanding
any other provision of law, taxes, fees, or assessments, as defined in
section 1903(w) (3) (A) of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C.
1396b(w) (3) (A)), that were collected by the State of New York from a
health care provider before June 1, 1997, and for which a waiver of the
provisions of subparagraph (B) or (C) of section 1903(w) (3) of such
Act has been applied for, in accordance with subparagraph (E) of such
section, and (if so applied for) upon which action by the Secretary of
Health and Human Services (including any judicial review of any such
proceeding) has not been completed as of July 23, 1997, are deemed
to be permissible health care related taxes and in compliance with the
requirements of subparagraphs (B) and (C) of section 1903(w) (3) of
such Act.
Pub. L. No. 105-33, 111 Stat. 515 (1997).
Pub. L. No. 105-34, 111 Stat. 788 (1997); see also City of New York, 118 S.Ct.
at
2095. Section 968 defined sellers eligible for the exemption by providing:
(2) QUALIFIED REFINER OR PROCESSOR. - For purposes of this subsection, the term "qualified refiner or processor" means a domestic corporation

-

(A) substantially all of the activities of which consist of the
active conduct of the trade or business of refining or processing
agricultural or horticultural products, and
(B) which, during the 1-year period ending on the date of
the sale, purchases more than one-half of such products to be
refined or processed from (i) farmers who make up the eligible farmers' cooperative which is purchasing stock in the corporation in a
transaction to which this subsection is to apply, or
(ii) such cooperative.
Pub. L. No. 105-34, 111 Stat. 896 (1997).
See City of New York, 118 S.Ct. at 2097 n.9. Both sets of plaintiffs sought
declaratory judgments that the Act was unconstitutional. See id.
47 See id at 2097.
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care employee unions (New York appellees).4 Plaintiffs in the other
case were Snake River Potato Growers, Inc. (Snake River), an Idaho
farmers' cooperative consisting of approximately thirty Idaho potato
growers, and Mike Cranney, an individual Idaho potato grower and
also a member and high-ranking officer of the cooperative." Consolidating the two cases, the district court found that at least one
plaintiff in each case possessed standing. 50 Addressing the merits, the
district court held that the cancellations violated the Bicameralism5 '
and Presentment Clauses." Following the district court's disposition,
the United States Supreme Court granted judicial review under the
Act's Expedited Review provision, a statutory directive providing for

See City of NewYork v. Clinton, 985 F. Supp. 168, 171 (D.D.C. 1998).
See id. at 172.
so See id. at 175, 177.
51 In the particular context of the lawmaking functions, "bicameralism" refers
to
the opening text of Article I, section 7, clause 2 ("Every Bill which shall have passed the
House of Repeentatives and the Senate, shall, before it become a Law, be presented to
the President of the United States. .. .") (emphasis added). U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7,
cl. 2. The district court referred to the opening text of Article I, section 7, clause 2,
as the "Bicameralism" Clause. See City of New York, 985 F. Supp. at 178. The Court,
however, has employed different terminology; instead of referring formally to a
"Bicameralism Clause," the Court refers to Article I, section 7, clauses 2 and 3, simply as the Presentment Clauses. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 946 (1983). For
the full text of the Presentment Clauses, see supra note 13 and accompanying text.
In contrast to the language of the district court, the Chadha Court refers only to the
"bicameral requirement" of Article I, section 7, clause 2 ("Every Bill which shall have
passed the House of Representatives and the Senate .... "). See Chadha, 462 U.S. at
946. Bicameralism refers also to the provision of Article I, section 1, vesting all legislative powers in a Congress of the United States, "which shall consist of a Senate and
House of Representatives." U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 1; see also Chadha, 462 U.S. at 946;
Thomas 0. Sargentich, The ContemporaryDebate About Legislative-Executive Separationof
Powers, 72 CORNELL L. REv. 430, 436 (1987) (defining bicameralism as the requirement "that majorities of both Houses of Congress must adopt a bill or resolution
constituting an exercise of legislative power").
52 See City of New York, 985 F. Supp. at 178-79. Judge Thomas
F. Hogan reasoned
that the cancellations violated the constitutionally prescribed procedures for the enactment, repeal, or amendment of a law in two ways. See id. First, the court explained that the "truncated" laws that emerged after the President's line-item veto
were different from those that the two Houses of Congress consented to during the
legislative process. See idi Second, the judge noted that the President could act unilaterally, through the line-item veto, to revise the lawmaking process, and the Act
impermissibly evaded the requirement that the President sign or veto an entire bill
in toto. See id, at 179. Providing another basis for his decision, the judge held that
the Act violated the separation of powers. See id. The Act, the court contended, impermissibly delegated legislative power to the President, "namely, the authority to
permanently shape laws and package legislation." Id. at 181. The court concluded,
"Although the Act may have presented an innovative and effective manner in which
to control runaway spending by Congress, the Framers held loftier values." Id.
9
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accelerated direct appeal to the Court." U9on
full review, the Court
5
affirmed the judgment of the district court.
Although Congress may authorize expedited judicial review, the
Court nonetheless demands that a plaintiff allege a concrete injuryin-fact to establish standing before the Court will exercise judicial review.'" In 1980, the Supreme Court in Bryant v. Yelen examined the
degree of concreteness of injury required to establish standing. 7 In
Bryant, the Court considered whether a water-limitation rule under
federal reclamation laws applied to large tracts of land in southeastern California. 8 Such an application, the majority maintained, would
have provided to landowners with significant acreage an incentive to
sell any excess lands at prices below the prevailing market price for
irrigated land. 9 Farmers, who were denied the possibility of purchasing excess lands, appealed the district court's holding that the irrigation limitation was inapplicable. 60 The Court found that the farmers
had standing even though the farmers could not establish with certainty their ability to purchase the excess lands.6 ' In sum, the SuSee Clinton v. City of New York, 118 S. Ct. 2091, 2095 (1998). This Expedited
Review provision accelerates judicial review by expressly authorizing "any Member of
Congress or any individual adversely affected" by the Act to initiate an action, in the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia, for injunctive or declara5s

tory relief challenging the constitutionality of a provision of the Act. 2 U.S.CA
§ 692(a)(1) (West 1997). Orders by the United States District Court for the District
of Columbia relating to challenges to the Act "shall be reviewable by appeal directly
to the Supreme Court of the United States." Id. § 692(b). Emphasizing expedited
consideration, Congress declared that "[i] t shall be the duty of the District Court for
the District of Columbia and the Supreme Court of the United States to advance on
the docket and to expedite to the greatest possible extent the disposition of any matter" brought under the Expedited Review provision. Id. § 692(c).
Expedited judicial review provisions have appeared with some frequency in several recent significant congressional enactments. See Devins & Fitts, supra note 38, at
358 & n.41 (referring to expedited review provisions in the Gramm-RudmanHollings Deficit Control Act, the Federal Election Campaign Act, and the Communications Decency Act). The inclusion of expedited review provisions may reflect a
congressional desire to delegate responsibility for determining the constitutionality
of its enactments to the Court, thus avoiding inconvenient internal congressional
deliberations over constitutional issues. See i& at 358-59.
, See City of New York, 118 S. Ct. at 2108.
55 See Tushnet, supra note 21, at 820 (noting that injury-in-fact is an Article III
requirement, and, therefore, Congress cannot authorize the courts to decide cases
unless there is an injury-in-fact.")
447 U.S. 352 (1980).
57 See i&L
at 366.
58 See i. at 368.
59 See id. at 366-67.
60 See id. at 366.
61 See id. at 367. In 1967, the United States sought a declaratory
judgment in
federal district court that the excess-acreage limitation applied to the private lands
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preme Court held that the farmers had a "sufficient stake" in the controversy to satisfy standing requirements because a reversal of the
judgment would result in the likelihood that excess lands would be
available for purchase at below-market prices.6
In 1993, the Court again encountered the concept of injury-infact in Northeastern Forida Chapterof the Associated General Contractorsof
America v. City of Jacksonville.0 In that case, the Court examined a
challenge by an association of general contractors to a city ordinance
that accorded preferential treatment to certain minority-owned businesses in the award of city contracts." The issue for decision, Justice
Thomas stated, was whether the contractors' association, in order to
possess standing to challenge the ordinance, had to demonstrate that
a member would have received a city contract but for the city ordinance." The Court held that the association had standing even absent proof that a member would have been awarded a city contract
but for the discriminatory ordinance." Justice Thomas reasoned that
in southeastern California. See id. at 365. When the district court ruled against the
government, the Solicitor General decided not to seek an appeal on behalf of the
United States. See id. at 365-66. Farmers, residents of the area desiring to purchase
excess lands if an irrigation limitation adhered,*had been given leave by the district
court to participate as amici. See id. at 366. When the United States chose not to
prosecute the case further, the farmers moved to intervene for purpose of appeal.
See iii The district court denied the motion. See id.
62 See Biyant, 447 U.S. at 368. The Court held that it was "unlikely that any of the
800 owners of excess lands would sell land at. below current market prices" without
the operation of the limitation on irrigation, and it was "likely that excess lands
would become available at less than market prices" if the limitation were given effect. I&
63 508 U.S. 656 (1993).
See id. at 658-59. The Jacksonville ordinance was entitiled "Minority Business
Enterprise Participation." See i& at 658. The ordinance required an automatic setaside of 10% of the total amount spent on city contracts for each fiscal year for
"Minority Business Enterprises," defined as businesses with at least 51% "minority"
or female ownership. See id.
rA See i& The court of appeals had held that the contractors' association suffered
no injury because it had failed to allege that Jacksonville would have awarded a
member of the association a city contract but for the operation of the ordinance. See
id. at 664 (citing Northeastern Fla. Chapter of the Associated Gen. Contractors of
Am. v. City of Jacksonville, 951 F.2d 1217, 1219-20 (11th Cir. 1992)). The contractors' association, therefore, had not established standing to challenge the ordinance.
See i&
66 See iii at 666. The Court's succinct retort to the position of the court of appeals was that its holding "cannot be reconciled with our precedents." Id. at 664.
Examining several of those precedents in turn, the Court looked first to Turner v.
Fouche. See i& (citing Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346 (1970) (involving an equal
protection challenge by a non-owner of property to a Georgia law that limited school
board membership to property owners)). Justice Thomas explained that the Turner
Court determined that the plaintiff had standing to challenge the law even absent
any allegation that the plaintiff would have been appointed to the board were it not
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the injury-in-fact in the context of a preferential set-aside program
was the impaired bargaining position of one group, not the failure to
obtain a city contract. 7
In the precursor line-item veto case of Raines v. Byrd, the Court
clarified further the contours of the injury-in-fact requirement of
standing.6 In Raines, Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court,
considered a congressional challenge to the Act." The Court placed
for the property limitation. See i& (citing Turner, 396 U.S. at 361 n.23). To obtain
standing in Turner, the Court relayed, "[a]ll that was necessary was that the plaintiff
wished to be considered for the position." Id. at 664.
Turning next to Clemetis v. Fashing, the Court noted that the plaintiffs had
standing despite the lack of any allegation that they actually would have been
elected to office but for the operative provision. See id. (citing Clements v. Fashing,
457 U.S. 957 (1982) (involving a number of Texas officeholders claiming that a provision of the Texas Constitution, requiring automatic resignation from office for a
state officeholder upon his or her announcement of candidacy for another state office, violated their equal protection rights)).
Completing the review of the precedential trilogy, the Court reexamined Regents of the University of Californiav. Bakke. See id at 665 (citing Regents of the Univ.
of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (involving an equal protection claim by a white
male applicant of an admissions program reserving a block of places for minority
applicants)). The Court noted that the plaintiff in Bakke had standing though he
was unable to establish that he would have been admitted to the medical school absent the affirmative action admissions program. See id (citing Bakke, 438 U.S. at 28081 n.14).
The Court concluded that the reviewed precedents could stand for a single
proposition:
When the government erects a barrier that makes it more difficult for
members of one group to obtain a benefit than it is for members of
another group, a member of the former group seeking to challenge
the barrier need not allege that he would have obtained the benefit
but for the barrier in order to establish standing. The "injury in fact"
in an equal protection case of this variety is the denial of equal treatment resulting from the imposition of the barrier, not the ultimate inability to obtain the benefit.
Id at 666.
67 See id (citing City of Richmond v.J.A. Croson Co., 488
U.S. 469, 493 (1989)).
The Court concluded that to establish standing a party challenging a set-aside program similar to Jacksonville's "need only demonstrate that it is able and ready to bid
on contracts and that a discriminatory policy prevents it from doing so on an equal
basis." Id at 666.
117S. CL 2312 (1997).
69 See id at 2317-18. Revisiting the doctrine of legislative standing,
the Court
considered whether allegations of an official-capacity injury to legislators conferred
standing upon certain members of Congress challenging the constitutionality of the
Act. See id at 2318. Specifically, the plaintiff legislators alleged that the Act injured
them in their official capacities because the Act (a) would change the legal and
practical effect of votes they might cast on bills with vetoable items, (b) would divest
the legislators of their role in repealing legislation, and (c) would change the balance of powers between the Congress and President. See id at 2316 (citation omitted).
See id. at 2315. On January 2, 1997, only one day after the Act went into effect,
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the congressional challenge in context by reviewing the fundamental
tenets of the Court's standing doctrine." Focusing on the specific
standing issue presented in Raines, the majority then distinguished
the injury alleged by the members in Raines from the claim of Congressman Adam Clayton Powell in Powel v. McCormackO that the
House of Representatives denied him improperly his congressional
seat and salary." Similarly, the Court deemed inapposite the legisla-

six members of Congress filed a complaint in the District Court for the District of
Columbia. See id. The members of Congress included Senators Robert Byrd, Carl
Levin, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, and Mark Hatfield, and Congressmen David Skaggs
and Henry Waxman. See id. at 2315 n.1. These members brought suit under the
Expedited Review provision, section 692(a)(1). See id. at 2316. For a discussion of
expedited review see supranote 53 and accompanying text.
See Raines, 117 S. Ct. at 2317. The Court reiterated the "bedrock requirement"
that Article III demands a case or controversy to obtain before a federal court has
jurisdiction over a dispute. See id. (citing Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 471 (1982)).
Noting that standing is a crucial element of the case-or-controversy requirement,
ChiefJustice Rehnquist stated for the Court that "[a] plaintiff must allege personal
injury fairly traceable to the defendant's allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to be
redressed by the requested relief.'" Id. (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751
(1984)). Focusing on the injury-in-fact prong of standing, the Court recited that a
plaintiff must allege that he or she has a "personal stake" in a dispute and that he or
she has suffered a "particularized" injury. See id. (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992)). The majority further emphasized that a plaintiff
must also allege a legally and judicially cognizable injury that is concrete and particularized rather than abstract. See id. (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560). The Court
added that the standing inquiry is "especially rigorous" in a case calling for the
Court to decide the constitutionality of the act of a coordinate branch. See i& at
2317-18. The Court completed the injury-in-fact overview by stating that the proper
inquiry is whether the members of Congress "met their burden of establishing that
their claimed injury is personal, particularized, concrete, and otherwise judicially
coqizable." I& at 2318.
395 U.S. 486, 549-50 (1969) (holding that the congressional challenge by a
member of Congress, Adam Clayton Powell, to his expulsion from the House of
Representatives, and concomitant loss of salary, presented a case or controversy under Article III).
7
See Raines, 117 S. Ct. at 2318. The Court deemed the Powell decision distinguishable on the ground that, unlike Congressman Powell, the plaintiff members of
Congress in Raines had not been "singled out for specially unfavorable treatment as
opposed to other Members of their respective bodies." I& at 2318. The Court explained that the Raines plaintiffs claimed only that the Act caused "a type of institutional injury (the diminution of legislative power), which necessarily damages all
Members of Congress and both Houses of Congress equally." I& Second, the Court
stated that the Raines plaintiffs claimed no loss of a concrete private right to which
they would be personally entitled, such as a congressional seat after successful election, as was the case with Congressman Powell. See id. Instead, the Court noted that
the claim was based on a deprivation of political power, an alleged injury which
"runs (in a sense) with the Member's seat, a seat which the Member holds (it may
quite arguably be said) as trustee for his constituents, not as a prerogative of personal power." Id
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tive standing case of Coleman v. Miller7' in which the Court held that
twenty Kansas state legislators, alleging vote nullification, had standing to challenge the ratification of a federal constitutional amendment." The Raines Court turned away the plaintiffs' argument that
Coleman constituted a dispositive precedent sufficient to establish
their standing to challenge the Act.78 After distinguishing these
precedents, the majority suggested that historical practice similarly
failed to provide any support for the appellees' arguments." The
Raines Court held that the members of Congress who raised the challenge had not established standing because they claimed only an institutional injury rather than a personal injury and, thus, failed to satisfy Article III standards. 7
The standing issue aside, the Court addressed the procedural
requirements of the Presentment Clause of the Constitution in the
seminal case of INS v. Chadha.7 In Chadha, the Court examined the
constitutionality of a legislative veto. 80 To preface the Court's constitutional reasoning, Chief Justice Burger, writing for the Court, dismissed as constitutionally indispositive efficiency-based policy argu-

74

307 U.S. 433 (1939).

See id, at 438 (finding that the legislators had standing to challenge the ratification because their votes were nullified when the lieutenant governor broke a 20-20
voting deadlock).
76 See Raines, 117 S. Ct. at 2318-21. In contrast to Co/eman, the members of Congress in Raines did not allege "that they voted for a specific bill, that there were sufficient votes to pass the bill, and that the bill was nonetheless deemed defeated. In
the vote on the Line Item Veto Act, their votes were given full effect. They simply
lost that vote." Id. at 2320. The Raines plaintiffs suffered no vote nullification, but
rather an "abstract dilution of institutional legislative power...." Id. at 2320-21.
See id. at 2321. Chief Justice Rehnquist declared that several episodes in
American history evidenced "that in analogous confrontations between one or both
Houses of Congress and the Executive Branch, no suit was brought on the basis of
claimed injury to official authority or power." Id, at 2321 (referring to the confrontations between Congress and Presidents Andrew Johnson, Grant, Cleveland, and
Wilson over the Tenure of Office Act).
75

78

See id. at 2322.
462 U.S. 919 (1983).

80 See id. at 923. A legislative veto is a "rejection of a presidential or
administrative-agency action by a vote of one or both houses of Congress without the consent
of the president." JAMES Q. WILSON & JOhiNJ. Diluuo, JR., AMERiCAN GOVERNMENT:
THE ESSENTIALS

A48 (6th ed. 1995). Coinciding with the emasculation of the non-

delegation doctrine and growth in executive bureaucratic activities in the 1930s, the
legislative veto developed as a congressional check on administrative agencies to
which Congress had delegated substantial discretionary authority. See CHEMERINSKY,
supra note 18, at 238. To enhance its oversight powers, Congress would include provisions ("legislative vetoes") in statutes authorizing Congress, one of its houses, or
one of its committees to overturn an agency decision or rule, typically by a simple
resolution of either chamber that bypassed the normal lawmaking process. See i&

1636

SETON HALL LA WREVIEW

[Vol. 29:1618

ments made in favor of the legislative veto."' Turning from policy to
constitutional design, the Court focused on the purposes underlying
the Presentment Clause and bicameralism, which ultimately guide
the Court's resolution of the constitutional issue.8 Linking premises
in a chain of reasoning, the majority then proceeded by way of implicit syllogism toward the ultimate conclusion that the legislative
veto was unconstitutional.8s The Court returned to the notion that
Article I imperatives must displace the pragmatic value of efficiency
represented in the form of the legislative veto." With reference to
bicameralism and the Presentment Clause, the Court proffered a
now-classic statement that the Framers concluded that "the legislative

81 See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 945. Justice White in dissent supplied the policy position that the legislative veto served as a useful mechanism of political innovation. See
id. at 972-73 (White, J., dissenting). While conceding thatJustice White's "utilitarian
argument" had validity, the Court nonetheless maintained that policy arguments
"are subject to the demands of the Constitution which defines powers and... sets
outjust how those powers are to be exercised." Id. at 945.
See i& at 946-51. Deriving support not from legal precedent but from historical evidence, the Court discerned several principles underlying the Presentment
Clauses and bicameralism:
[T] he Framers were acutely conscious that the bicameral requirement
and the Presentment Clauses would serve essential constitutional functions. The President's participation in the legislative process was to
protect the Executive Branch from Congress and to protect the whole
people from improvident laws. The division of the Congress into two
distinctive bodies assures that the legislative power would be exercised
only after opportunity for full study and debate in separate settings.
The President's unilateral veto power, in turn, was limited by the
power of two thirds of both Houses of Congress to overrule a veto
thereby precluding final arbitrary action of one person.
Id at 951.
See id. at 951-58. ChiefJustice Burger's opinion for the Court resembles a syllogism. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 18, at 239. The major premise is that Congress
must meet the constitutional requirements of bicameralism and presentment whenever legislating. See i& The minor premise is that a legislative veto represented an
attempt at legislation without fulfilling bicameralism and presentment. See id. In
determining that a legislative veto was the type of action to which the procedural requirements of bicameralism and presentment applied, the Court declared that the
one-House veto was indeed "essentially legislative in purpose and effect" in that the
veto "alter[ed] the legal rights, duties and relations of persons ....." Chadha, 462
U.S. at 952. Articulating the inexorable syllogistic conclusion, the Court declared
the legislative veto unconstitutional as an act of legislation that failed to adhere to
the constitutional procedures of bicameralism and presentment. See id. at 957-58
("To accomplish what has been attempted by one House of Congress in this case requires action in conformity with the express procedures of the Constitution's prescription for legislative action: passage by a majority of both Houses and presentment to the President.").
4 See Chadha, 462 U.S.
at 958-59.
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power of the Federal government be exercised in accord with a single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered, procedure."
The Court confronted this "finely wrought" procedure again in
considering the constitutionality of the Act in Clinton v. City of New
Yo*. 5 The Court held that the appellees had standing to challenge
the constitutionality of the Act and, in reaching the merits, that the
cancellation procedures of the Act violated the Presentment Clause.87
Justice Stevens, writing for the Court, opened the opinion with a
brief summary of the passage of the Act, the Court's holding in
Raines, and the Court's instant holding." The Justice then reviewed
Id. at 951. With this straightforward interpretation of the constitutional procedures for legislative action, the Chadha decision may be viewed "as an effort to reassert an understanding of the text of the Constitution as more or less selfcontained, with clear answers to at least some problems. The Court's opinion seems
to assume that the text is itself dispositive of the constitutional question." STONE ET
AL., supra note 18, at 441. The Court itself emphasized the importance of text for its
decision: "Explicit and unambiguous provisions of the Constitution prescribe and
define the respective functions of the Congress and of the Executive in the legislative process." Chadha, 462 U.S. at 945. In this sense, the Court's opinion in Chadha
represents a classic formalist approach to separation of powers issues in that the
Court "treats the text of the Constitution and the intent of its drafters as controlling
and changed circumstances and broader policy outcomes as irrelevant to constitutional outcomes." Gerhardt, supra note 30, at 239. Rejecting the opposing functionalist argument, the Court in Chadha found that "the fact that a given law or procedure is efficient, convenient, and useful in facilitating functions of government,
standing alone, will not save it if it is contrary to the Constitution. Convenience and
efficiency are not the primary objectives - or the hallmarks - of democratic government .... " Chadha, 462 U.S. at 944. Functionalists object to the formalism of
Chadha, because "its holding that the veto is unconstitutional [did] not turn upon
any fact concerning the veto's origin, its purposes, or its balance of power effects.
Rather, the decision [was] ...based upon the language of the Constitution, upon its
structural dictates, not upon the function of the veto." Stephen Breyer, The Legislative Veto After Chadha, 72 GEO. L.J. 785, 790 (1984). Expressing the view that the legislative veto serves essential functions, Justice White in dissent defended the mechanism as "an important if not indispensable political invention that allows the
President and Congress to resolve major constitutional policy differences, assures
the accountability of independent regulatory agencies, and preserves Congress' control over lawmaking." Chadha, 462 U.S. at 972-73 (White, J., dissenting). Whereas
formalists maintain that "separation of powers doctrine is governed by relatively
clear rules that demarcate separate spheres of governmental authority ...functionalists believe in a more fluid approach that prohibits
'aggrandizement of power' or 'undue mingling of functions,' but that allows some
overlap and is more receptive to changing the boundaries..." so that government
may constitutionally adapt to changing modern circumstances. STONE ET AL., supra
note 18, at 424-25; see also Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE
L.J. 1725, 1738 (1996) ("[T]he application of functional analysis almost always upholds the results that the political branches produce.").
118 S. Ct. 2091 (1998).
87 See idi
at 2095.
N See i& at 2094-95.
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the background and purposes of the canceled statutory items at issue." Setting the factual basis for the Court's later discussion of
standing, the majority next described the effects of the cancellations
upon the plaintiffs. 90
See id. at 2095-97. In chronicling the events precipitating the passage of section 4722(c) of the Balanced Budget Act, Justice Stevens recited that Congress in
1991 had legislatively mandated that federal Medicaid subsidies to the states were to
be proportionately reduced by the sum amount of certain state taxes levied on
health care providers. See id, at 2095 & n.1 (citing Medicaid Voluntary Contribution
and Provider-Specific Tax Amendments of 1991, Pub. L. 102-234, 105 Stat. 1793,
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(w) (1994)). The Department of Health
and Human Services (HHS), the Court continued, notified the State of New York in
1994 that the 1991 Act covered 15 of its taxes, but that the state could apply to HHS
for a statutory waiver of its substantial obligations. See id. at 2095. Before HHS acted
on a New York waiver request, the Justice pointed out, Congress preempted the
waiver process, to the state's fiscal relief, by passing section 4722(c) of the Balanced
Budget Act of 1997 on August 5, 1997. See id. Justice Stevens recited that President
Clinton, adhering to the procedures of the Act, notified both chambers of Congress
on August 11, 1997, that he was canceling section 4722(c) as a new direct item of
spending on the basis that the cancellation would reduce the federal budget deficit.
See id. at 2095-96.
In parallel fashion, the majority elaborated the circumstances preceding the
passage of section 968 of the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, the other item at issue
canceled by the President. See id. at 2096-97. Owners of food processing or refining
companies, Justice Stevens iterated, would not obtain the usual benefits of capital
gains tax deferral in selling those facilities to farmers' cooperatives because the
stocks of such cooperatives could be held only by its members. See id. at 2096. To
permit such sellers to obtain the benefits of tax deferral, the Justice remarked, Congress passed section 968 of the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 for the purpose, "as repeatedly explained by its sponsors," of promoting the sale of processors and refiners
to farmers' cooperatives. See id. Justice Stevens stated that the President canceled
the limited tax benefit of section 968 on the same day that he canceled section
4722(c). See id at 2096-97.
90 See id at 2097. Justice Stevens noted that section 4722(c) of the
Balanced
Budget Act of 1997 eliminated the contingent liability of the appellee New York
health care providers if HHS were to deny the state's waiver requests. See id. The
Justice concluded that the President's cancellation of that section revived that substantial contingent liability for those providers. See id The State of New York estimated that its total liability could approach 2.6 billion dollars. See id at 2095. The
majority reiterated the holding of the district court that the presidential cancellation
reviving the contingent liability constituted "sufficient injury" to qualify the health
care providers for standing. See id. at 2097.
Turning to the Snake River appellees, Justice Stevens surmised that Snake River
assembled in May 1.997, when Congress was considering section 968, as an effort to
assist Idaho potato growers. See id Snake River, according to the Justice, had
.concrete plans to take advantage" of the benefits of section 968 of the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997. See id The majority determined that appellee Mike Cranney, an
officer acting on behalf of Snake River, was negotiating with the owner of an Idaho
processor who would be eligible for the capital gains recognition deferral of the Act.
See id The Court concluded that the President's cancellation of section 968 effectively ended the negotiations. See id. Justice Stevens added that Snake River was
considering the purchase of other facilities were the Court to reverse the President's
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Moving from review to substantive issuesJustice Stevens focused
on threshold jurisdictional questions similar to those with which the
Court contended in Raines." The Court, addressing initially the
statutory standing issue, rejected the government's argument that the
appellees were not "individuals" within the meaning of the Expedited
Review provision of the Act.9 Viewing the Expedited Review provision in the context of the entire section, Justice Stevens reasoned that
the Court should construe "individual" broadly to include not just
natural persons but corporate persons as well."
The majority then turned to an extended analysis of the government's contention that the appellees' challenge was nonjusticiable because the Court lacked jurisdiction.9 Accenting the importance of Article III jurisdiction, Justice Stevens pointed to the earlier
disposition in Raines as demonstrative of the Court's respect for the
constitutional limits of its jurisdiction regardless of manifest congrescancellation. See id. The Justice again referred to the holding of the district court
that the President's cancellation of section 968 injured the Snake River appellees
because they "'lost the benefit of being on equal footing with their competitors and
will likely have to pay more to purchase processing facilities now that the sellers will
not [be] able to take advantage of section 968's tax breaks.'" I& (quoting City of
New York v. Clinton, 985 F. Supp. 168, 177 (D.D.C. 1998)).
91

See id. at 2098-2102.

See City of New York, 118 S. Ct. at 2098. The government maintained that Mike
Cranney was the only statutory "individual" among the appellees, and therefore, the
only one with standing under section 692(a) (1). See id. The Court cast a suspicious
judicial eye upon the fact that, although this statutory jurisdictional argument was
not waived, the "able lawyers for the Government" failed to raise this argument at
the district court level. See id.
93 See id. The Court clarified that while "individual" and "person"
are effectively
synonymous in ordinary usage, "person" frequently acquires broader legal meaning
and can include not just individuals but corporations, companies, and other like
business entities. See id, at 2098 n.13. The Court contended that the Expedited Review provision indicated an "unmistakable congressional interest in a prompt and
authoritative judicial determination" of the Act's constitutionality. See id. at 2098.
For the Court, responding to Justice Scalia's dissent, there would be "no plausible"
explanation that could reconcile the manifest congressional intent for expedited
review with a crabbed interpretation of "individual" that excluded nonnatural corporate persons. See id. & n.14. Justice Stevens ultimately rejected the Government's
"new-found reading" of section 692 because it "'would produce an absurd and unjust
result which Congress could not have intended'" I. at 2098 (quoting Griffin v.
Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 574 (1982)).
In response to this absurdity argument, Justice Scalia in dissent countered that
the disparate treatment by Congress of individuals and corporations is not "so bizarre" to justify the Court in ascribing a "'scrivener's error'" to Congress. See id. at
2111 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In characteristically
pungent fashion, Justice Scalia announced, "It may be unlikely that this is what Congress actually had in mind; but it is what Congress said, it is not so absurd as to be an
obvious mistake, and it is therefore the law." Id.
94
See id. at 2098-2102.
92
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sional intent for expedited review. 95 With that disclaimer in place,
the Justice found that the appellees had sufficiently alleged a personal stake in having an actual injury redressed as opposed to the abstract and widely dispersed institutional injury in Raines." To justify
this finding of constitutional standing, the majority systematically
dismantled the government's arguments that (a) neither the New
York appellees nor Snake River appellees were actually injured because their claims were too speculative, and (b) the wrong parties advanced the claims. 97
Turning first to the New York appellees, Justice Stevens suggested that the state was laboring under a multi-billion dollar contingent liability that section 4722(c) of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997
had eliminated." The Justice noted that the state suffered a significant immediate injury when the President's cancellation of section
4722(c) revived its substantial contingent liability." The Court also
rejected the government's argument that, because the claim be95

See id.
at 2099.

96

See id.

See id.
at 2099-2102.
See City of New York, 118 S. Ct. at 2099. According to justice Stevens,
the significance of the contingent liability was made "self evident" because New York lobbied Congress for section 4722(c), because Congress devoted specific statutory attention to providing New York relief from the liability, and because the President
canceled only the one provision within a lengthy act. See id.By way of analogy, the
Court compared the effect of the President's cancellation to the effect of an appellate court judgment setting aside a defendant's verdict and remanding a several billion dollar damages claim for a new trial. See id.Such a verdict reversal, the justice
noted, would deprive the defendant of relief from liability and, therefore, cause the
defendant immediate injury even if a second trial's outcome is speculative. See id.
The Court concluded, therefore, that the President's cancellation of section 4722(c)
caused immediate injury because that section constituted the "legislative equivalent
of a favorable finaljudgment." See id.
at 2099 n.16. The district court had "correctly
concluded,"Justice Stevens propounded, that the appellees and New York State had
"'suffered an immediate, concrete injury the moment that the President used the
Line Item Veto to cancel section 4722(c) and deprived them of the benefits of that
law."' See id.
at 2099 (quoting City ofNew York, 985 F. Supp. at 174).
99 See id.The Justice added that the revival of a significant
contingent liability
impacts upon the financial strength, fiscal planning, and borrowing power of the
obligor. See id.Countermanding the government's "misplaced" reliance on Anderson v. Green, the majority factually distinguished that California case. See id.at 2099
n.16 (citing Anderson v. Green, 513 U.S. 557 (1995) (per curiam)). In Anderson,
Justice Stevens synopsized, plaintiffs challenged a California statute, ineffective without a waiver from HHS, that imposed limits on welfare payments to first-year residents. See id.The Court noted that the Anderson majority held that the plaintiffs suffered no injury and that the case was not ripe because the HHS waiver had been
vacated and the plaintiffs were receiving benefits. See id,(citing Anderson, 513 U.S. at
559). In contrast with the New York appellees, the Justice insisted, the plaintiffs in
Anderson labored under no contingent liability. See id
97
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longed only to the State of New York, the wrong parties advanced
New York's claim.'" Justice Stevens maintained that both the City of
New York and the appellee health-care providers had the same potential liability as the state.'0 ' This same liability existed, the Court
continued, because the state would employ state statutes to assess the
City and the health-care providers for large portions of recoupment
payments that the state would have to make to the federal government.'"
Analytically migrating from New York to Idaho, the Court found
that the President's cancellation of the limited tax benefit of section
968 caused the Snake River farmers' cooperative a legally cognizable
injury because the cancellation deprived the appellees of their
"statutory 'bargaining chip."""3 In support of this holding that the
appellees had suffered an important and specific injury, Justice Stevens pointed to the purpose of section 968, to the President's selectivity and rationale in cancelling, and to the organizational purpose,
planning, and negotiations of the Snake River cooperative.'" The
Justice then analogized to the injury suffered by appellees in Bryant v.

'

See id. at 2099.
101 See id. at 2099-2100. Disputing the government's reliance on Waorth v. Seldin,
the majority distinguished the present case by noting that the New York law would
require automatically that the health care providers reimburse the state for funds
that the state would have to repay the federal government. See id at 2100 n.19. By
contrast, the plaintiffs in Warth, Justice Stevens ascertained, were without standing to
challenge the exclusionary zoning practices of a separate community because their
claimed injury turned on the autonomous actions of third parties. See id (citing
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 509 (1975)).
02 See id. at 2099-2100.
'03 See id. at 2100.
104 See City of Ne, York, 118 S. Ct. at 2100. Specifically, Justice
Stevens posited that
the farmers' cooperative obtained the "equivalent of a statutory 'bargaining chip'"
with which it could effectuate the "congressional plan" for which Congress purposefully enacted section 968 to dispense a defined benefit confined to particular purchasers and assets. See i& With regard to the President's selectivity, the Justice adjudged that section 968 was one of only two limited tax benefits (out of 79 total
authorized by the Taxpayer Relief Act) that the President chose to cancel. See i.
The President justified the cancellation, Justice Stevens continued, upon the notion
that Snake River's use of those statutory bargaining chips would have a significant
effect on the budget deficit. See i. Finally, with regard to the organizational imperative, the Justice explained that Snake River was organized for the precise purpose of buying facilities, the cooperative had "concrete plans" to maximize the benefits of section 968, and the cooperative was actively involved in "ongoing
negotiations" with a facility owner interested in utilizing section 968 at the time the
President canceled that section. See id The Court added that Snake River was
"actively searching" for other facilities among the "ample" number available in Idaho
should the Court reverse the President's cancellation. See i.
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Yellen"05 further to support the Court's conclusion that the deprivation of a statutory bargaining chip is a sufficiently concrete injury.' 6
The Court countered the government's argument that Snake
River would have suffered an Article III injury only if Snake River actually would have obtained a refiner and processor on favorable
terms. °7 Relying on the Court's holding in NortheasternF/trida,10"Justice Stevens suggested that the end result of a negotiating process is
irrelevant for standing purposes because the denial of a bargainingprocess benefit alone can create an injury under Article III.', Justice
Stevens next addressed the government's argument that the cooperative was the wrong party before the Court in that the owner selling
the processing facility to the cooperative would have received the
benefit of the capital gains tax deferral."0 This argument was flawed,
the Justice maintained, because it failed to recognize that Congress
intended the cooperatives, not the sellers, to be the beneficiaries of
the canceled section.'
This argument, the Justice continued, also
ignored the "self-evident proposition" that multiple parties may have
standing to sue."' The Court concluded its jurisdictional analysis by
determining that the appellees had standing."'
447 U.S. 352 (1980).
See City of New York, 118 S. Ct. at 2100-01. See supra notes 56-62 and accompanying text for a discussion of Btyant. After describing the facts and holding in Bryant, the Court concluded that the Snake River appellees had alleged an injury "that
is as specific and immediate as" that of the plaintiffs in Byant. See id. at 2101.
107 See it. at 2101 n.22.
JOB508 U.S. 656 (1993).
109 See City of New York, 118 S. Ct. at 2101 n.22.
See supra notes 63-67 and accompanying text for a discussion of NortheasternFlorida The Court then quickly disposed
of the traceability and redressability elements of standing after finding that both the
New York and Snake River appellees were actually injured. See id. The majority
noted that each injury is traceable to a cancellation by the President, and that a declaratory judgment invalidating the cancellations would redress the injuries. See id.
"o
See id. at 2101.
I See id.
112 See id. Justice Stevens stressed that once the three requirements of standing
1i

10

are met, a plaintiff has standing, regardless of whether other parties might also challenge a particular action. See id. at 2101-02. The Court distinguished the instant
case from Allen v. Wright and Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization See
id. at 2102 n.23 (citing Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984); Simon v. Eastern. Ky.
Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976)). The Justice noted that plaintiffs lacked
standing in those cases because of the speculative or attenuated chains of causation
between the alleged injuries and the challenged actions. See id. (citing Allen, 468
U.S. at 758; Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. at 42-43). Sharpening the point
of this discussion, Justice Stevens drew attention to the distinguishable injury in the
case at bar. See id. The injury suffered by Snake River, the Justice elaborated, is
"comparable to the repeal of a law granting a subsidy to sellers of processing plants
if, and only if, they sell to farmers' cooperatives. Every farmers' cooperative seeking
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Turning at last to the merits, Justice Stevens noted that the Act
gives a president cancellation power over several types of provisions
previously signed into law."4 The majority first highlighted the undisputed fact that the New York case involved one type of provision,
an "item of direct spending,""" and that the Snake River case involved another type of provision, a "limited tax benefit.""6 Focusing
on another undisputed fact, the Court maintained that the President
had signed into law each of the provisions pursuant to the Presentment Clause before he canceled the provision." 7 Justice Stevens then
delineated the precise statutory procedures to which the President
must adhere in exercising his cancellation authority."8 Further, the
to buy a processing plant is harmed by that repeal." Id.
", See iii at 2102 ("Thus, we are satisfied that both
of these actions are Article III
'Cases' that we have a duty to decide.").
14
See i& Specifically, section 691 states:
[T] he President may, with respect to any bill or joint resolution that
has been signed into law pursuant to Article I, section 7, of the Constitution of the United States, cancel in whole (1) any dollar amount of discretionary budget authority;
(2) any item of new direct spending; or
(3) any limited tax benefit ....
2 U.S.C.A. § 691(a) (West 1997).
115 See 2 U.S.C.A. § 691e(8) (West 1997). Under section 691e(8), the term "item
of new direct spending" refers to "any specific provision of law that is estimated to
result in an increase in budget authority or outlays for direct spending relative to the
most recent levels calculated pursuant to section 907 of this title." I& More specifically, under section 691e(5), "direct spending" means "(A) budget authority provided by law (other than an appropriation law); (B) entitlement authority; and (C)
the food stamp program." 2 U.S.C.A. § 691e(5).
116
See City of New York, 118 S. Ct. at 2102. Section 691e(9) defines "limited tax
benefit" to mean
(i) any revenue-losing provision which provides a Federal tax deduction, credit, exclusion, or preference to 100 or fewer beneficiaries
under Title 26 in any fiscal year for which the provision is in effect;
and
(ii) any Federal tax provision which provides temporary or permanent transitional relief for 10 or fewer beneficiaries in any fiscal
year from a change to Title 26.
2 U.S.C.A. § 691e(9).
':' See City of New York, 118 S. Ct. at 2102.
1 See id Under section 691(a), the President may cancel an allowed item if the
President:
(A) determines that such cancellation will (i) reduce the Federal budget deficit;
(ii) not impair any essential Government functions; and
(iii) not harm the national interest; and
(B) notifies the Congress of such cancellation by transmitting a
special message, in accordance with section 691a of this title, within
five calendar days (excluding Sundays) after the enactment of the law
providing the dollar amount of discretionary budget authority, item of
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Justice mentioned the concept of a congressional "disapproval bill,"""
and pointed out that Congress had not passed such bills involving the
cancellations at issue.'"
Against this backdrop, the majority focused on the effect of a
presidential cancellation.'
Justice Stevens stressed that the plain,
unambiguous text of the Act states that the effect of a cancellation is
to deny that item legal force and effect. 2 Drawing the conclusion
from this line of reasoning, the majority determined that the President had amended, in legal and practical effect, two congressional
acts by repealing an item of each. 2 The Justice recognized that the
Constitution expressly assigns some responsibilities to a president in
the lawmaking process, but emphasized nonetheless that no constitutional provision grants presidential authorization for the enactment,
amendment, or repeal of statutes. 24
The Court next distinguished between a presidential "return" of
a bill pursuant to the Presentment Clause and the exercise of a president's cancellation power pursuant to the Act." The constitutional
"return," Justice Stevens set out, is of the entire bill before the bill becomes law. 2 The statutory cancellation, the Court contrasted, is of
new direct spending, or limited tax benefit that was canceled.
2 U.S.CA § 691(a). Further, the President must consider the legislative history,
purposes, and other relevant information in identifying items for cancellation. See
id.§ 691(b).
The Court noted that the President "meticulously followed these procedures" in
cancelling the items at issue. See City of New York, 118 S. CL at 2102.
119 See City of New York, 118 S. CL at 2102. The term "disapproval bill" refers to "a
bill or joint resolution which only disapproves one or more cancellation of dollar
amounts of discretionary budget authority, items of new direct spending, or limited
tax benefits in a special message transmitted by the President under this subchap-

ter...." 2U.S.CA§691e(6).

See City of New York, 118 S. Ct. at 2102. The Court observed that Congress had
enacted only one disapproval bill, over a presidential veto, despite that fact that
President Clinton had canceled 82 items since passage of the Act. See i& at 2102
n.24.
1
See i& at 2102-03.
in See id.at 2103 (citing 2 U.S.C.A. § 691e(4)(B)-(C)). A presidential cancella120

tion of an item of new direct spending and a limited tax benefit prevents that item
"from having legal force and effect." 2 U.S.C.A. § 691e(4)(B)-(C) (West 1997). For
the full statutory language, see supranote 43.
in See City of New York, 118 S. Ct. at 2103. To portend that this presidential repeal
will run afoul of Article I requirements, Justice Stevens in the next sentence appended the following: "'[R]epeal of statutes, no less than enactment, must conform
with Art. I." Id (quoting INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 954 (1983)) (alteration in
original).
See id
125
126

See id.
See id.
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only part of a bill after the bill becomes law.'" After establishing that
the Constitution is silent on the subject of a president's unilateral action repealing or amending elements of duly enacted statutes, the
majority suggested several reasons for interpreting constitutional silence as the effective equivalent of an explicit prohibition."
The
Court concluded that the President's cancellations truncated two
bills that both Houses of Congress had approved, and, therefore, the
changed bills failed to conform to the law enactment procedures of
Article I, section 7. Justice Stevens punctuated this section of the
opinion by quickly refuting the government's argument that the
"lockbox"'so provisions of the Act prevented the cancellations from
effecting a repeal of the canceled items and 3noting that the cancellation deprives an item of legal effect or force. '
The Court next examined the first of two government arguments advanced to support the position that the cancellations did not
amend or repeal duly enacted statutes!" Justice Stevens recounted
that the government relied primarily on Field v. Clark' to contend
that the cancellations were mere exercises of presidential discretionary authority.'3 The majority identified several distinctions between
a president's suspension power approved in Fied, and the President's
cancellation power.'5 First, Justice Stevens stressed that presidential
See id.
See id Delineating these reasons, the Court pointed to the Founders' "great
debates and compromises" that had produced the procedures of Article I governing
the enactment of bills into law. See id These debates and compromises, examined
in conjunction with other abundant historical evidence, claimed the Court, generated the inexorable conclusion reached initially by the Court in Chadha; the enactment of statutes must only "'be exercised in accord with a single, finely wrought and
exhaustively considered, procedure.'" Id. at 2104 (quoting Chadha,462 U.S. at 951).
1
See City of New York, 118 S. Ct. at 2104.
M See id at 2104 n.31. The majority explained that the "lockbox" provisions
of
the Act ensure that dollars saved through cancellation are devoted solely to deficit
reduction. See id.
1 See id at 2104. The Court responded to the government's contention by returning to the express text of the Act that provides that a cancellation deprives an
item of legal force or effect. See id (citing 2 U.S.C.A. § 691e(4)(B)-(C) (West
1997)). Simply because the "lockbox" provisions ensure that a cancellation would
have a continuing budgetary effect on the government, the majority explained, does
not alter the fact that the cancellations rendered the items inoperative with regard
to the various appellees. See id ("Section 968 of the Taxpayer Relief Act no longer
provides a tax benefit, and § 4722(c) of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 no longer
relieves New York of its contingent liability.").
1
See id. at 2105-07. The government advanced these arguments, the Court remarked, despite "the unambiguous provisions of the Act." Id at 2105.
127

1

13 143 U.S. 649 (1892).
13
13

See City of New York, 118 S. Ct. at 2105.
See id at 2105-06.
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cancellations would be based necessarily on the identical conditions
Congress considered in passing the statutes given that cancellations
must occur within five days of congressional passage." Second, the
Justice surmised that the Act did not meaningfully qualify the President's discretion regarding his decision to cancel." 7 Third, the majority noted that a presidential cancellation constituted a rejection of
the policy preferences of Congress.'ie Based on these distinguishing
factors, the Court concluded again that the cancellations were functionally equivalent to partial repeals of duly enacted statutes and thus
were violative of the Presentment Clause."9
Justice Stevens, rounding out the discussion of Fied, undermined the government's reliance upon other unchallenged statutes
discussed in that case.' 40 The Justice noted that the cited statutes involved questions of foreign trade. 4 ' More significantly, the majority
maintained that, under Field, Congress retained decision-making
See id. at 2105. In Field, by contrast, the President contingently exercised the
suspension power upon a condition nonexistent at the time of passage of the Tariff
Act. See id
137 See id. Justice Stevens, while acknowledging that the
President had to make
three determinations prior to cancellation, dismissed these determinations as indeterminative of the President's range of discretion. See id; see also supra note 118 and
accompanying text for discussion of the determinations. Under the Tariff Act at issue in Field, the Court contrasted, the President had a certain duty to suspend when
he had determined that a defined contingency had ripened. See City of New York, 118
S. Ct. at 2105..
IsA See City of New York, 118 S. Ct. at 2106. Presidential suspensions under the Tariff Act, the Justice averred, actually executed congressional policy captured in the
statute. See id Justice Stevens added that each exercise of cancellation authority
would necessarily represent a presidential rejection of congressional policy given
that a cancellation must come within five days of passage by Congress and, therefore,
would be based on the same considered facts and circumstances. See id at 2106 &
n.35.
1

"9

See id. at 2106.

See id. The Court noted that several of the statutes authorized a president to
discontinue or suspend duties upon an executive determination that other nations
had abolished their own discriminatory duties. See id. (citing Field v. Clark, 143 U.S.
649, 686-87 (1892)). Justice Stevens added that another statute authorized a president to repeal provisions imposing duties on foreign ships upon the basis of a similar nondiscrimination executive determination. See id (citing Field, 143 U.S. at 687).
The Justice noted that the Court in Field did not consider whether the statutes adhered to the strictures of the Presentment Clause. See id at 2106 n.36.
141 See id at 2106. The Court has long recognized, according to the Justice, that
in the field of foreign affairs a president possesses "'a degree of discretion and freedom from statutory restriction which would not be admissible were domestic affairs
alone involved.'" Id. (quoting United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S.
304, 320 (1936)). Justice Stevens reinforced the point by noting that the Field Court
confined its reasoning to the context of unique presidential discretion in foreign
affairs. See id. at 2106 n.38.
10
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authority to suspend or repeal by specifying within the enactment
events that would trigger presidential action."" Contrasting these circumstances with the characteristics of presidential authority embodied by the Act, the Court concluded that a president, constrained
only by his own policy preferences, has the power under the Act effectively to repeal laws without adherence to Article I, section 7, procedures.'
Justice Stevens found similarly unpersuasive the second government argument that presidential cancellation does not repeal or
amend statutes because the cancellation authority compares favorably to a president's traditional discretionary authority over appropriation expenditures." The distinguishing characteristic of the Act, the
Court countered, is that the Act confers upon the President the
uni5
lateral power to alter the content of properly enacted statutes."
In dicta, Justice Stevens emphasized three final points.'" First,
the justice stressed that the Court's opinion is not a referendum on
the wisdom of the Act, nor does the Court cavalierly conclude that a
duly enacted statute is unconstitutional. 4 7 Second, the majority
stated that the Presentment Clause issue was dispositive, and, therefore, the Court did not consider the alternative grounds for unconstitutionality, a separation of powers violation.' Third, the Court em1
See id at 2106. The only determination remaining for a president, the majority noted, was whether specified events had in fact occurred. See id at 2106 & n.39
(citingj.W. Hampton,Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 407 (1928)).
1
See id. at 2106. Although Congress may have intended for the President to acquire such authority, the justice announced, Congress no more than the President
may alter the constitutional procedures for enactment of laws. See id at 2107. The
Court also dispensed with the government argument that the Rules Enabling Act, 28
U.S.C. § 2072(b), permits the Court to repeal earlier laws without violating the Presentment Clause. See id at 2107 n.40. As distinguished from the Act, Justice Stevens
contrasted, Congress itself, as it similarly did with the tariff statutes in Field, decided
in enacting section 2072(b) to repeal prior rules contingent upon the occurrence of
a specific event, i.e., the Court's promulgation of new procedural rules. See id
See City of New Yor*, 118 S. Ct. at 2107. justice Stevens stated that the government reviewed several statutes in which Congress conferred upon the executive significant discretion over the appropriated expenditures. See id The purported argument flowing from this review, the Court continued, is that the Act merely confers
upon the President similar expenditure discretion over appropriated funds. See id
1
See id The justice succinctly stated that none of the statutes the government
reviewed "could even arguably have been construed to authorize such a change." Id
14 See
id.
147 See id The Court recognized that both Houses of Congress
had debated and
deliberated over the Act, and that President Clinton had signed the text into law.
See id Though the majority's view was contrary to the wishes of the other branches,
the Court cautioned, the Court twice had full argument and briefing on the constitutionality of the Act and had "concluded that [the Court's] duty is clear." Id.
4
See id at 2107-08. The Court disavowed any necessity to examine the issue of

1648

SETONHALL L4WREVEW

[Vol. 29:1618

phasized the narrow ground of the decision, that the procedures prescribed by the Act conflict with constitutionally prescribed procedures. 49 The Justice punctuated the opinion by suggesting that the
amendment procedures of Article V of the Constitution, not ordinary
legislation, are the proper means to the ends sought by the advocates
of the Act.'
Justice Kennedy authored a separate concurring opinion.'' Responding to Justice Breyer's dissent, the Justice stressed that the Act
threatened the liberties of the citizenry.15 The Framers designed the
separation of powers, Justice Kennedy instructed, believing that concentration of power impairs the value of liberty.' 3 The Justice reathe scope of Congress' authority to delegate lawmaking authority, though the issue
was argued and briefed at length. See i& The narrow issue of the Presentment
Clause, the Justice reviewed, was the dispositive issue, and, therefore, the Court need
not consider the alternative grounds the district court provided. See i&Lat 2108. The
Court also need not consider, the justice appended, whether the discretionary
budget authority provisions would be severable from the limited tax benefit and direct spending provisions because the Act lacks a severability clause. See i& at 2108
n.43; see also supra notes 114-16 and accompanying text for discussion of various provisions.
149 See City of New York 118 S. Ct. at 2108. Underscoring
the essential point, the
Court emphasized that
The Balanced Budget Act of 1997 is a 500-page document that became
"Public Law 105-33" after three procedural steps were taken: (1) a bill
containing its exact text was approved by a majority of the Members of
the House of Representatives; (2) the Senate approved precisely the
same text; and (3) that text was signed into law by the President. The
Constitution explicitly requires that each of those three steps be taken
before a bill may "become a law."
Id. (citing U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 7). Valid enactment of a statute, the Justice reiterated, requires that the President and both chambers of Congress concur and vote on
precisely the same text. See id.Justice Stevens stressed that the Line Item Veto Act
would confound this rigorous constitutional process by authorizing the President "to
create a different law - one whose text was not voted on by either House of Congress or presented to the President for signature." Id.
150 See
id.
'5'
See i& (Kennedy, J.,concurring).
152 See id. The suggestion, according to Justice
Kennedy, that Congress and the
President "have a somewhat free hand to reallocate their own authority" is based on
the "inadmissible" premise that the public good requires it. Id. ("The Constitution's structure requires a stability which transcends the convenience of the moment."). Justice Kennedy advised that a second flawed premise is that "liberty is not
at risk" when the political branches reallocate power. Id. justice Kennedy asserted
that "[1] iberty is always at stake when one or more of the branches seek to transgress
the separation of powers." Id at 2109 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
153 See id at 2109 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Taking issue with
the implied misconception that the Bill of Rights diminished the importance of the doctrine of
separation of powers, the concurrence insisted that the Framers employed the separation of powers and federalism "to secure liberty in the fundamental political sense
of the term." Id.
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soned that individual liberty depends upon constitutional constraints
on the unilateral capacity of any single branch of government to dictate basic political decisions."" Viewed in this light, Justice Kennedy
pointed out that the Act aggrandized presidential power beyond the
scope of the Framers' vision of that power.'o Then, the Justice asserted that the voluntary cession of power by Congress to the President does not make the cession "innocuous."lw Similarly, Justice
Kennedy contended that Congress cannot yield the powers of subsequent Congresses any more than its own.' Justice Kennedy reiterated that the Act, contrary to the separation of powers, undermines
the political liberty of citizens by unconstitutionally enhancing presidential power beyond the Framers' conception.' Justice Kennedy
noted that the constitutional safeguards of federalism and electoral
control are available to control the improvident spending problem.""
Closing his concurrence with an assertive concession, Justice Kennedy stated that the line-item veto under the Act is unconstitutional
even if federalism, electoral accountability, and the separation of
powers are ultimately inadequate in dealing with the problems addressed by the Act."e
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice O'Connor, and by Justice Breyer
in part, wrote a separate opinion, concurring in part and dissenting
in part. 6 1 Justice Scalia concurred with the majority that the New

See id Because "[m]oney is the instrument of policy and policy affects
the
lives of citizens," the Justice argued, the liberty of citizens is sacrificed if the employment of the "instrument" is determined by the President alone absent congressional constraints. Id.
155 See City of New York, 118 S. Ct. at 2109 (Kennedy,
J., concurring). Justice Kennedy characterized the Act as the "functional equivalent" of a line-item veto in that
the Act has the effect of enhancing the president's power to discriminate among
groups, taxpayers, and states. See id
SPSee id.
157 See id. ("Abdication of responsibility is not part of the
constitutional
15 See id. at 2110 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
The Justice suggesteddesign.").
that the
154

"device" of the separation of powers operates along a "horizontal axis" to ensure an
equilibrium among the three branches. See id Operating along a "vertical axis"
also, the concurrence continued, the separation of powers embraces the notion that
citizens have a defined liberty interest in the "regularity" of the branches' exercise of
power. See id Justice Kennedy contended, "If this point was not clear before
Chadha, it should have been so afterwards." Id
15 See id Justice Kennedy referred to an "informed
and responsible electorate"
as a mechanism for control of the political branches. See id
160 See id ("The Framers of the Constitution
could not command statesmanshik.").
See City of New York, 118 S. Ct. at 2110 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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York appellees had constitutional standing.'6 2 The Justice also agreed
that the Court had statutory authority to decide the challenge,
though Justice Scalia rejected the Court's conclusion that the Expedited Review provision provided that authority. '6 The Justice dissented from the Court's jurisdictional holding that Snake River had
established constitutional standing.'" Dissenting from the main
holding of the majority, Justice Scalia determined that the procedures of the Act were constitutionally permissible./1
Justice Scalia began his jurisdictional analysis by chastising the
majority for misreading the statutory Expedited Review provision in
66
the Court's "unrestrained zeal" to decide the case on the merits.
Justice Scalia concluded that only a particular appellee, Mike Cranney, was an "individual" pursuant to the Expedited Review provision.1 67 The Justice employed a plain-language analysis to conclude
that the Expedited Review provision did not confer jurisdiction to
the Court over the claims of any of the appellees except for the
"individual," Mike Cranney.'6 Before dismissing the claims, however,
Justice Scalia would have granted the appeal upon alternative
grounds."
162

Se id.

163 sei
164 See
165

id.
See id Justice Breyerjoined only this portion ofJustice Scalia's opinion. See id.

166

See id.

See City of New York, 118 S. Ct. at 2110 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). The other appellees, Justice Scalia observed, were corporations,
companies, and government entities, none of which are "individuals" according to
"any accepted usage of that term." Id
See id. at 2110-11 (Scalia,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). "Worse
still" than the majority's deviation from accepted usage, the Justice relied on the first
provision of the United States Code for confirmation that "Congress speaks English
like the rest of us," in that the definition of "person," not "individual," embraces
corporations, companies, and other similar entities. See id. (citing 1 U.S.C. § 1
(1994)). "And doubly worse," according to the Justice, is that the Act's definitional
provisions explicitly distinguished between "person" and "individual." See id.at 2111
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing 2 U.S.C.A.
§ 691e(9) (B) (iii) (West 1997)). The majority, Justice Scalia surmised, "majestically
sweeps the plain language of the statute aside .... " Id
See id. at 2111 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Justice
Scalia found statutory standing by conducting a multi-step analysis. See id The appellees pursued declaratory relief, Justice Scalia instructed, not only under the Expedited Review provision but also under the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §
2201, thereby invoking the jurisdiction of the district court under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
See id The government filed dual appeals, the Justice explained, after the decision
of the district court, one to the Court and the other to the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia. See id. Justice Scalia deemed the government's appeal a petition for a writ of certiorari before judgment pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2101(e) (1994).
167
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Turning from statutory to constitutional standing, the Justice offered an extended critique of the Court's conclusion that the Snake
River appellees had constitutional standing to challenge the President's cancellation. 70 Examining the Court's concept of a statutory
bargaining chip as a standing injury, Justice Scalia asserted that the
Court's concept was wrong either as a matter of law or as a matter of
fact upon the facts alleged.'
Asserting first that detriment to bargaining position is not a legally cognizable injury, the Justice ques7 for the propotioned the Court's reliance upon Northeastern Florida!
sition that the denial of a bargaining-process benefit can constitute
an injury-in-fact.7 The Justice maintained that Northeastern Florida,an
equal protection case, never held that an impaired bargaining position was an injury-n-fact. 4 The case law, Justice Scalia surmised,
supports the proposition only that the demonstrated deprivation of a
bargain confers standing, not the simple detriment to some bargaining position.' 75
See id. The Court may grant such a petition, the Justice recounted, under the
Court's Rule 11, which states that
[a] petition for a writ of certiorari to review a case pending in a United
States court of appeals, before judgment is entered in that court, will
be granted only upon a showing that the case is of such imperative
public importance as to justify deviation from normal appellate practice and to require immediate determination in this Court.
Sup. Cr. R. 11. Deriving support from Rule 11, Justice Scalia finally determined that
the entire case qualified for certiorari review before judgment because "of the public
importance of the issues involved, and the little sense it would make for the Government to pursue its appeal against one appellee in this Court and against the others in the Court of Appeals. ... " Id.
Tweaking Justice Scalia for this conclusion, the majority stated that the Court
"need not rely on [its] own sense of the importance of the issue involved" because
the structure of the Expedited Review provision indicated that Congress desired expedited review of the issues. I& at 2098 n.14.
170 See City of New Yok 118 S. Ct. at 2111-15 (ScaliaJ., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
1
See id. at 2111-12 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
17 508 U.S. 656 (1993).
17 See City of New York, 118 S. Ct. at 2112 (Scalia, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
174 See id. Northmtern Florida held instead, Justice Scalia clarified,
that the denial
of equal treatment is the injury in an equal protection case. See id. That case is
"inapposite," the Justice asserted, because Snake River did not allege equal protection violations in challenging the Act. See id,
1
See id. From Justice Scalia's view, the Court's proposition was contradicted by
Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization. See id. (citing Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976)). Justice Scalia stressed that the "situation in
that case was strikingly similar to the one before us here: the denial of a tax benefit
to a third party was alleged to reduce the chances of a financial benefit to the plaintiffs. And standing was denied." Id.
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Assuming legal injury did exist, the Justice further maintained
that Snake River, as a matter of fact, had insufficiently alleged facts to
demonstrate that it had suffered such an injury.'76 Snake River provided no evidence,Justice Scalia suggested, demonstrating either that
it was actually bargaining or that the President's cancellation harmed
its bargaining position. Because the facts failed to indicate that any
discussions amounted to true negotiations, the Justice concluded that
the assertion that Snake River suffered a harmed bargaining position
was purely conjectural."
Continuing his standing analysis, Justice Scalia determined, contrary to the Court, that Snake River had not established standing because the cooperative had not suffered a sufficient economic injury.7
If the economic injury was the cooperative's loss of a bargain price of
a processing plant, the Justice countered, neither allegation nor evidence existed that any such purchase was likely prior to the President's cancellation.' 80 The Justice noted that in two prior cases in
which the Court examined whether the government's tax treatment
of a third party conferred standing upon a plaintiff, the Court had
held that the plaintiff lacked standing because of the speculative
causal connection between the tax changes at issue and the actions of
the third party.'" Justice Scalia stated that any connection between a
sale of a processing facility and the capital gains tax deferral was

176 &WeI&

See i& at 2112-13 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The
Justice remarked that the Snake River suit "resembles a complaint asserting that the
plaintiff's chances of winning the lottery were reduced, filed by a plaintiff who never
bought a lottery ticket, or who tore it up before the winner was announced." Id. at
2112 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Despite the majority's
contention that Snake River was actively negotiating a purchase, Justice Scalia suggested instead that the record indicated only that two "discussions" had occurred
between Snake River and prospective sellers. See i& at 2112-13 (Scalia, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
7
See iii at 2113 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The facts
alleged, the Justice observed, "never even bring things to the point of bargaining...." I& Justice Scalia then referred to the Court's longstanding conclusion
that hypothetical or conjectural injuries do not accord a plaintiff Article III standing.
See id. (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)).
79 See City of New Yor, 118 S. Ct. at 2113 (Scalia, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
ISOSee iS Justice Scalia commented that if Snake River's allegations sufficed to
constitute "likelihood" of injury, then the Court "must adopt for [its] standing jurisprudence a new definition of likely: 'plausible.'" Id.
IM, See iti at 2113-14 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing
Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 759 (1984); Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org.,
426 U.S. 26, 42-43 (1976)).
177
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completely speculative.'/ The Justice finally distinguished Bryant v.
Yellen,"' upon which the majority relied.'" Distinguishing Bryant on a
factual basis, Justice Scalia surmised that while the would-be purchasers in Bryant had both accessible financing and willing sellers,'86
Snake River, by contrast, appeared to be without readily available financing and surety of sale.'" From these distinctions the Justice concluded that no basis existed for the assertion that Snake River likely
would have purchased a facility if the President had not canceled section 968.187
Distinguishing Bryant on a doctrinal basis, Justice Scalia posited
that the Court had subsequently invalidated Bryant's crabbed conception of the standing doctrine. '8 While Snake River might have had a
sufficient stake in the controversy to satisfy the Bryant test, the Justice
stated that Snake River failed satisfactorily to allege injury-in-fact,
traceability, and redressability to satisfy the Court's current standing
requirements.'" Justice Scalia concluded that the Court had no jurisdiction to decide Snake River's challenge to the President's cancellation of section 968 because Snake River lacked standing.'"
The Justice concurred with the Court, however, that the New
York appellees had standing to challenge the President's cancellation
of section 4722(c).19' Departing from the Court's conclusion, Justice
Scalia determined that the President's cancellation did not violate
the Presentment Clause.'9 The Justice noted that the President can-

See id. at 2114 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
447 U.S. 352 (1980).
194 See City of New York, 118 S. Ct. at 2114-15 (Scalia,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
1
See iii at 2114 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing
Bryant v. Yellen, 447 U.S. 352, 367 n.17 (1980)).
6 See id.
187 See id.
188 See id. at 2114-15 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). Justice
Scalia suggested that the standing test employed by Bryant was no longer the prevailing standing standard. See id. Rather than following the Bryant standard requiring
only that a party have a sufficient stake in a controversy, Justice Scalia posited that
constitutional standing has a basis in the separation of powers that demands that a
party demonstrate the elements of injury-in-fact, causation, and redressability. See id
at 2115 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
1
1

189

See id

See City of New York, 118 S. Ct. at 2115 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
191 See id. Justice Scalia elaborated that the tax liability incurred by the
New York
appellees under New York law "is a concrete and particularized injury, fairly traceable to the President's action, and avoided if that action is undone." Id.
190

'9

See id.
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celed section 4722(c) only after Presentment Clause procedures had
been satisfied. 9 Contrary to the Court, Justice Scalia asserted that
the requirements of the Presentment Clause do not demand the
Court's conclusion.'" The Justice claimed that the nondelegation
doctrine,'95 rather than the Presentment Clause, governs the cancellations.'9 The Line Item Veto Act, Justice Scalia posited, implicates not
the Presentment Clause but rather this nondelegation doctrine. 97
With attention centered on the nondelegation doctrine, the Justice questioned whether congressional authorization under the Act
to cancel a spending item comports with a constitutional delegation
of congressional authority to the President 98 The Justice noted first
that the scope of presidential discretion under the Act is no broader
than is the scope of discretion the President traditionally exercises in
executing spending laws.'" Justice Scalia further pointed out that
Congress from its inception had authorized presidential discretion
over the expenditure of congressional appropriations of money.O
193

See id.

See id. at 2116 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice
Scalia stressed that the Presentment Clause "no more categorically prohibits the Executive reduction of congressional dispositions in the course of implementing statutes that authorize such reduction, than it categorically prohibits the Executive
augmentation of congressional dispositions in the course of implementing statutes
that authorize such augmentation - generally known as substantive rulemaking."
Id.
1
The nondelegation doctrine, Justice Scalia explained, is implicated when
"authorized Executive reduction or augmentation is allowed to go too far, it usurps
the nondelegable function of Congress and violates the separation of powers." Id
196
See City of New York, 118 S. Ct. at 2116 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
19
See id Justice Scalia pointed out that the Court had tacitly recognized the significance of the nondelegation doctrine for the decision in the instant case when the
majority discussed and distinguished the Field case. See id. The Court's distinctions,
the Justice articulated, had "nothing to do with whether the details of Art. I, § 7 have
been complied with," but instead related to the scope of congressional authority to
delegate power to the executive. Id
19 See id The Justice turned "to the crux of the matter: whether Congress's
authorizing the President to cancel an item of spending gives him a power that our
history and traditions show must reside exclusively in the Legislative Branch." Id.
9
See id. Justice Scalia had noted that other statutes, besides the Act, had authorized the President to "'cancel'" spending items. See id (citing Bowsher v. Synar, 478
U.S. 714, 733-34 (1986) (holding that the Comptroller General could not enforce
the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act because the spending of appropriated money was
an executive function and because only Congress could remove the Comptroller
General, constituting an unconstitutional legislative invasion on an executive function)).
2W
See id. Justice Scalia referred to the longstanding congressional tendency to
leave to the president's discretion the expenditure of both lump-sum and individual
appropriations. See id. at 2116-17 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
194
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The Justice asserted that "there is not a dime's worth of difference"
between such a congressional authorization and the Act's authorization of a presidential cancellation of a spending item. 2 '
Bringing his opinion to a gradual close, Justice Scalia contended
that the Act's procedural technicalities complied with the requirements of the Presentment Clause, though the nondelegation doctrine was actually at issue.2 The Justice summarily stated that the
President's cancellation was not a line-item veto and that Congress
had permitted similar substantive actions throughout the nation's
history.203 Justice Scalia pungently proffered that the title of the Act
had "succeeded in faking out the Supreme Court."2
Justice Breyer, joined by Justice O'Connor and Justice Scalia,
authored a dissenting opinion.2 The Justice launched his lengthy
dissent by cursorily summarizing his view that the appellees had
standing and that the Act was constitutional.26 The dissent then explicated several background factors that guided the Justice's analysis. N 7 First, theJustice viewed the Act as a constitutionally proper legislative attempt to give the President the authority to give effect
selectively to some provisions of a massive appropriations bill.20 Secpart). The Justice mentioned also that presidents had occasionally claimed authority to impound appropriated funds even without congressional authorization for the
exercise of discretion. See id at 2117 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (discussing impoundment actions of Presidents Grant, Roosevelt, Truman, and
Nixon, "the Mahatma Ghandi of all impounders").
2
See id. at 2116 (ScaliaJ, concurring in part and dissenting in part).
See City of New York, 118 S. Ct. at 2118 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). Justice Scalia wrote:
The short of the matter is this: Had the Line Item Veto Act authorized
the President to "decline to spend" any item of spending contained in
the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, there is not the slightest doubt that
authorization would have been constitutional. What the Line Item
Veto Act does instead - authorizing the President to "cancel" an item
of spending - is technically different. But the technical difference
does not relate to the technicalities of the Presentment Clause, which
have been fully complied with; and the doctrine of unconstitutional
delegation, which is at issue here, is preeminently not a doctrine of
technicalities.
Id.
203 See id.
24 Id

See id (BreyerJ., dissenting).
See id.
See id at 2118-20 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
See City of New York, 118 S. Ct. at 2118 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Given the
population of the nation and the astronomical amount of the annual federal budget, Justice Breyer pragmatically pronounced, Congress cannot realistically, though could
constitutionally, divide a proportionately massive federal budget appropriations bill
into thousands or more separate appropriations bills that the President could sign or
2W
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ond, Justice Breyer noted that the Court has generously construed
the general language of the Constitution's structural provisions relating to legislative and executive powers.2" Finally, the dissent dismissed the idea that the Court should mediate interbranch disputes
such as the one posed in this case.2 '0 Drawing meaning from these
three considerations, the Justice forecasted his ultimate conclusion
that the Act violates neither the literal words of the Constitution nor
the nonliteral separation of powers.'
Turning first to his conclusion that the Act did not violate the
specific text of the Constitution, Justice Breyer capsulized the Court's
apparent reasoning in a syllogism."21 Suggesting that the Court's rea-

soning was flawed, the dissent determined that the President literally
had not repealed or amended any law in canceling the items. 213 Justice Breyer contended that Congress had conferred a power upon
the President, and that the President merely executed that power
contained in a constitutionally enacted statute."4 Many times before,
veto individually. See id. at 2118-19 (Breyer, J. dissenting). The question, the Justice
therefore posed, "is whether the Constitution permits Congress to choose a particular novel means to achieve this same, constitutionally legitimate, end." Id. at 2119
(Breyer,J., dissenting).
See id. at 2119 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Relying on the words of Chief Justice
John Marshall in McCulloch v. Mayland, the Justice drew attention "to the genius of
the Framers' pragmatic vision, which this Court has long recognized in cases that
find constitutional room for necessary institutional innovation." City of qvew York, 118
S. Ct. at 2119 (citation omitted).
210 See id
21 See i& at 2120 (Breyer, J., dissenting). For the
Justice, the fact that the Act may
closely resemble a literally unconstitutional circumstance is irrelevant: "To drive exactly 65 miles per hour on an interstate highway closely resembles an act that violates
the speed limit. But it does not violate that limit, for small differences matter when
the question is one of literal violation of law." Id.
The background circumstances also indicated to Justice Breyer that the Court
should flexibly interpret the nonliteral principles of the separation of powers to
produce a "'workable government."' See id. (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co.
v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring)). The Act would be
constitutional, the Justice argued, if the Court continued flexibly to construe those
principles with that objective in mind. See id
See id. According to Justice Breyer, the Court's syllogism is as follows:
Major Premise: The Constitution sets forth an exclusive method for
enacting, repealing, or amending laws.
Minor Premise: The Act authorizes the President to "repea[l] or
amen [d]" laws in a different way, namely by announcing a cancellation
of a portion of a previously enacted law.
Conclusion: The Act is inconsistent with the Constitution.
Id. (citations omitted) (alterations in original).
213 See id. Instead, the President, Justice Breyer maintained, merely
adhered to
the law and left the literal text of the statutes intact. See id.
214 See iii at 2121 (Breyer, J., dissenting). To sustain his point that the President
had not literally repealed or amended any statute, Justice Breyer discussed the text
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the Justice averred, Congress had delegated to Presidents the power
to execute in the form of a contingent power to prevent specific
statutory language from taking effect.2 The Act, the dissent continued, provides for a similar permissible delegation of power to a
president. 21 6 Focusing for a moment on the "lockbox" feature of the
Act, Justice Breyer argued that the Act only delegates to a president
the capacity to decide how to spend money allocated in a particular
item, not the power to cancel the expenditure altogether.2' The dissent declared that the Act's delegated authority is not the equivalent
of the amendment or repeal of a statute, and, therefore, the Act does

not violate any literal textual command of the Constitution. 28
Transitioning from a focus on text to an examination of implicit
constitutional structure, the Justice next explored the issue of
whether the Act violated the principles of the separation of powers.
Positing three separation of powers questions, the dissent dissected
each seriatim.2
of a hypothetical statute. See id at 2120-21 (Breyer, J., dissenting). From this hypo-

thetical, the Justice proposed, comes the conclusion that "one cannot dispose of this
case through a purely literal analysis as the majority does." Id. at 2121 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting). Further, to establish that the Justice's conclusion of the Act's literal
constitutional compliance is not merely a "formal quibble," Justice Breyer hypothesized the text of a will or trust instrument in order to advance the proposition that
the Act also resembles traditional delegation of discretionary authority. See id& The
trust hypothetical, according to the Justice, "illustrates the logic that must apply
when a power to execute is conferred, not by a private trust document, but by a federal statute." Id.
215

See City of New York, 118 S. Ct. at 2121 (BreyerJ., dissenting). All of the exam-

ples of constitutional statutes, like the Act itself, Justice Breyer advocated, involved

proper delegations of power. See i& at 2122 (Breyer, J., dissenting). The Justice asserted that "the delegated power to nullify statutory language was itself created and
defined by Congress .
Id.
216 See id.

217 See id. at 2122-23 (Breyer, J., dissenting). The Justice determined
that the
lockbox feature lends legal significance to the enactment of an appropriation item,
though, employing the dispositive statutory terms of the majority again, the President's cancellation may have neutered the item of "'force or effect.'" See i& The
lockbox, Justice Breyer asserted, simply "delegates to the President the power to decide how to spend the money to which the line item refers - either for the specific
purpose mentioned the [sic] item, or for general deficit reduction via the 'lockbox'
feature." Id. at 2123 (BreyerJ., dissenting).
18 See id. at 2123 (Breyer, J., dissenting). The conclusion, to which the Court
gravitated, that the Act's procedures differ from the procedures of the Presentment
Clause is "beside the point," the dissent determined. See id. The Justice summed up
that the Congress and the President enacted the Act itself in accordance with the
Constitution's procedures, and the Act's failure to force the President to meet the
requirements of those procedures is of no constitutional moment because the Act
does not literally grant the President the power to amend or repeal statutes. See i&
219 See id. at 2123-31 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
no See id. Specifically, Justice Breyer asked:
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Justice Breyer explained first that the Act properly conveys executive, rather than legislative, power in that a presidential cancellation executes the Act."' Even if the power is characterized as legislative, the Justice noted, the Court had found often that more than one
branch may constitutionally exercise a certain power. 2 In light of
the cases in which the Court had upheld congressional delegation of
various types of authority to other federal entities, Justice Breyer
maintained that the authority ceded by the Act is closer conceptually
to executive power than it was in those prior cases. 223
Attending to the second separation of powers issue, the dissent
demurred that the Act did not undermine the principal purpose of
the separation of powers, which is to protect individual liberties by
maintaining the federal government's tripartite structure. 24' The Justice, in rapid succession, asserted that the Act does not encroach
upon the power of Congress,2 5 that the Act's substantive objective is
(1) Has Congress given the President the wrong kind of power, i.e.,
"non-Executive" power? (2) Has Congress given the President the
power to "encroach" upon Congress' own constitutionallv reserved territory? (3) Has Congress given the President too mu( h 1 ,wer, violating the doctrine of "nondelegation?"
Id. at 2123 (Breyer, J., dissenting). The Justice added that "with respect to this Act,
the answer to all these questions is 'no.' Id
22
See City of New York, 118 S. Ct. at 2123 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer
suggested that any differences between the power delegated by the LAct and the
delegated authority Congress has granted often to the President are "differences in
de ree, not kind." Id.
See id. Examples of possible shared powers, the dissent declared, include the
power to make broadly applicable rules or to adjudicate claims. See id
2
See id at 2123-24 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer referred particularly
to
Congress's delegation of rulemaking and adjudicatory authority to bureaucratic
agencies in American Trucking Ass'ns v. United States. See id. at 2123 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing American Trucking Ass'ns v. United States, 344 U.S. 298, 310-13
(1953)). The dissent also referred to the sentencing guideline-writing authority
delegated to a commission in Mistretta v. United States. See id. at 2123-24 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (citing Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 412 (1989)). Finally, Justice Breyer cited the independent counsel appointment authority to a three-judge
panel in Morrison v. Olson. See id. at 2124 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing 487 U.S. 654,
696-97 (1988)). In answering "no" to the first question, the dissent decided, therefore, that any separation of powers violation "must rest, not upon purely conceptual
grounds, but upon some important conflict between the Act and a significant Separation of Powers objective." Id.
2
See id. at 2124 (BreyerJ., dissenting).
2
See id. There was no such encroachment, the dissent delineated, because
Congress retained the powers (a) to insert into future legislation a designation of
the inapplicability of the Act, (b) to issue a disapproval bill to reinstate any canceled
provisions, and (c) to draft and enact the very appropriations statutes potentially
subject to the Act. See id Responding to Justice Kennedy's concurrence, Justice
Breyer concluded that the delegated power authorized by the Act is thus sufficiently
confined in that "the President acts only in response to, and on the terms set by, the
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proper,2 and that the Act's grant of authorization to a president
does not aggrandize the executive.2"
Moving finally to the last issue, the Justice examined the Act in
the context of the nondelegation doctrine2 8
Invoking the
"intelligible principle doctrine,"'' the dissent discussed the procedural, purposive,23' and substantive3 2 ways in which the Act supplied
such a principle. ss Justice Breyer admitted the breadth of the resulting standards but added that the Court had upheld equally broad or
broader standards in the past.2 3 In only two cases, the Justice pointed

Congress." Id.
. See id.The Justice justified this conclusion by asserting that even the earliest
Congresses conferred on the executive the exact type of discretionary authority over
spending embodied in the Act. See i& To a hypothetical objection of a Member of
Congress to a presidential cancellation, Justice Breyer suggested that a proper response would be, "'But a majority of Congress voted that he have that power; you
may vote to exempt the relevant appropriations provisions from the Act; and if you
command a majority, your appropriation is safe.'" Id. Given this available response,
the dissent asked, "Where is the encroachment?" See id at 2125 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
See City of New York, 118 S. Ct. at 2125 (Breyer,
J., dissenting). The Act's grant
works no such aggrandizement, the Justice instructed, because it is confined to the
budget context, and any strengthening of the office "seems minute when compared
with the changes worked by delegations of other kinds of authority that the Court in
the past has upheld." Id. (citations omitted).
See id. at 2125-31 (Breyer,J. dissenting).
See id. at 2125 (Breyer,J. dissenting). Justice Breyer explicated the intelligible
principle doctrine by asserting that the Constitution allows Congress to "'see[k] assistance from another branch' of Government, the 'extent and character' of that assistance to be fixed 'according to common sense and the inherent necessities of the
governmental co-ordination.'" Id. (quoting J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United
States, 276 U.S. 394, 406 (1928)) (alteration in original). The Justice recited Chief
Justice Taft's statement that a constitutional delegation of power exists if Congress
"'shall lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the person or
body authorized to [act) is directed to conform."' Id (quoting J W Hampton, 276
U.S. at 409) (alteration in original).
230 See id. The procedure, forJustice Breyer, was found among the
considerations
a president must weigh in deciding to cancel a particular provision. See id. (citing 2
U.S.C.A. § 691(b) (West 1997)); see also supra note 118 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the considerations.
23 See City of New York, 118 S.Ct. at 2125 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
The clear purpose behind the Act, the Justice noted, is the promotion of improved fiscal accountability and the elimination of tax breaks and wasteful spending. See id
232 See id. The substantive element promoting an intelligible
principle, the Justice
proffered, is that a president must determine that a cancellation would reduce the
federal budget deficit without impairing essential government functions or the national interest. See id. (citing 2 U.S.C.A. § 691(a) (A)); see also supra note 118 and accompanying text.
T
See City of New York, 118 S. Ct. at 2125 (Breyer,J., dissenting).
Seeid
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out, had the Court declared a congressional delegation of authority
violative of the nondelegation doctrine.2
The dissent delineated several relevant elements of the instant
case that bear similarity to factors found in earlier nondelegation
cases. L" First, the Justice commented that Congress aimed the Act at
a discrete problem. T7 Second, Justice Breyer explained that the discrete problem eludes a more specific standard.
Third, the dissent
divined that the historical tendency of Congress to delegate expenditure authority to a president helps justify the instant delegation of
power.2
Finally, the Justice suggested that Congress may constitutionally rely upon history and context as sources supplying the standard guiding presidential discretion.
The dissent openly acknowledged significant differences between previous permissible delegations and the delegation embodied
by the Act.24 1 Specifically, Justice Breyer explained that no subsidiary
or explanatory statutory rules circumscribe the President's discretion,
nor is his implementation subject to judicial review.2 4 These factors,
however, are indeterminative, the Justice continued, because electoral accountability circumscribes presidential discretion, and judicial
review is less appropriate in the context of presidential discretion
than it is with regard to agency discretion.
The nondelegation
analysis complete, Justice Breyer concluded that the power to prevent
See id.at 2126 (Breyer,J., dissenting) (citing Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S.
388, 430 (1935); A.LA Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 54142 (1935)). Gathering his conclusions on the intelligible principle aspects of the
Act, Justice Breyer summarized that "(a) the broadly phrased limitations in the Act,
together with (b) its evident deficit reduction purpose, and (c) a procedure that
guarantees Presidential awareness of the reasons for including a particular provision
in a budget bill, taken together, guide the President's exercise of his discretionary
powers." I&
See id. at 2126-27 (Breyer,J., dissenting).
27 See i& at 2126 (Breyer, J., dissenting). The
dissent discerned that the Act zeroed in on the discrete problem of a particular limited group of expenditures within
the federal budget, rather than diffusely approaching the entire economy. See id.
2
See i& at 2127 (Breyer, J., dissenting). "The statute's language," according to
the Justice, "is sufficient to provide the President, and the public, with a fairly clear
idea as to what Congress had in mind. And the public can judge the merits of the
President's choices accordingly." I&
2M See City of New York, 118 S. Ct. at 2127
(Breyer,J., dissenting).
240 See id.
241 See id. at 2127-28 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
2 See id. at 2128 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Such rules and judicial review,
the Justice explained, guard against unreasonable and arbitrary implementation. See i.

See id.With regard to electoral accountability, the Justice posited that the arbitrariness of a president's expenditure decisions is a question answerable by voters.
See i&
243
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spending items from taking effect conferred upon a president by the
Act did not conflict with the nondelegation doctrine. " Restating the
dissenting opinion's ultimate conclusion, Justice Breyer finally found
that the Act was constitutional.2'

2"

See id. Noting two distinctions between the spending items just considered

and a limited tax benefit, the dissent contended that the question of the limited tax
benefitwas more difficult. See id. Justice Breyer stated first that the history of presidential authority "to pick and choose" in the tax benefit area is less voluminous. See
id. Continuing the distinctions, the dissent discerned that the danger of a president's arbitrary exercise of delegated power takes on more gravity when the issue
relates to the increasing or decreasing of an individual's taxes. See id.Justice Breyer
determined, however, that these distinctions relating specifically to a limited tax
benefit are insufficient to alter the earlier nondelegation conclusion. See id.Providing the reasons for this determination, the Justice found first that the Court employs
a uniform nondelegation standard, a uniformity that extends to the tax area. See id.
Next, the dissent discerned that the Court's precedents reflected that Congress
could delegate to the President the authority to alter taxes under broad standards.
See id. at 2129 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). Contrary to the majority's
assertion, the statutes in Field, the Justice countered, did not at all impose a duty
upon the President. See id. Contrary to the Court, the Justice maintained that a
presidential cancellation does not reflect a rejection of congressional policy, but
rather the execution of a law in which Congress has indicated its preference for the
president's exercise of power. See id.at 2130 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Again contrary
to the Court, Justice Breyer noted that Congress had not confined the broad delegation of authority over taxation matters exclusively to the foreign policy area. See id
Finally, Justice Breyer commented that limitations on tax-related delegation diminish the protection for arbitrary exercise of presidential power. See id.Providing several reasons for this conclusion, the dissent delineated that (1) the Act does not
authorize a president to alter overall tax policy, (2) the Act demands that a president make a circumscribed and defined policy judgment, (3) the Act protects expectations of benefits by essentially informing a small group of affected taxpayers of
the conditions for cancellation, (4) the limited tax benefit provisions relate to a minor amount of total federal budget, and (5) the Act does not constitute a delegation
to a president to establish substantial tax policy because the Act treats tax benefits as
unique forms of spending. See id.
at 2130-31 (Breyer, J., dissenting). The resulting
conclusion, the Justice provided, is that the limited tax benefit provisions are sufficiently similar to the spending provisions to retain the same nondelegation result.
See id.
at 2131 (Breyer,J., dissenting).
245 See City of New York, 118 S. Ct. at 2131 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
The dissent
drew the opinion to a summary close:
In sum, I recognize that the Act before us is novel. In a sense, it skirts
a constitutional edge. But that edge has to do with means, not ends.
The means chosen do not amount literally to the enactment, repeal,
or amendment of a law. Nor, for that matter, do they amount literally
to the "line item veto" that the Act's title announces. Those means do
not violate any basic Separation of Powers principle ....They represent an experiment that may, or may not, help representative government work better. The Constitution, in my view, authorizes Congress
and the President to try novel methods in this way. Consequently, with
respect, I dissent.
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The Court in City of New York confronted an apparent paradox:
Did the Line Item Veto Act actually confer line-item-veto power upon
the President? Though the Act's title would seem to resolve immediately that question, perhaps the Act actually did not confer such
power.' 4 At bottom, the dispute between the Court and the dissenters centered on the constitutional significance of timing. The Justices diverged in addressing the case's fundamental issue: While a
presidential striking of certain items occurring prior to a president's
signature of a bill into law almost surely would run afoul of the Presentment Clause, is a presidential cancellation of an item after a
presidential signature of a bill also constitutionally infirm? 47 Asked
alternatively, is a post-signing presidential cancellation under the
Line Item Veto Act actually an unconstitutional line-item veto? The
Court determined accurately that timing isn't everything, constitu2 Congress considered three statutory approaches to item veto
legislation in the
1980s and during debate in 1996. See Joyce & Reischauer, supra note 29, at 96-97; see
also S. REP. No. 104-9, at 5 (1996). "Separate enrollment" legislation would require
the legislature's enrollment clerk, prior to going to a president for signature, to
break-up large appropriation or tax bills into smaller bills and then separately enroll
the smaller bills so that the President could veto the individual items. See S. REP. No.
104-9, at 5 (1996). "Expedited rescission" legislation would have modified the president's existing power under the 1974 Impoundment Control Act, under which
presidential proposals to cancel enacted budget authority would become effective
only if both Houses of Congress, free not even to consider the proposals, approved
the proposals within 45 days. SeeJoyce & Reischauer, supra note 29, at 96. Expedited rescission assured the President that at least one House of Congress would
consider and vote on proposed presidential cancellations, though the cancellations
took effect only if majorities of both Houses approved the presidential proposals.
See id. Finally, "enhanced rescission" legislation, the type of authority embodied in
the Act, takes rescission one step further in that proposed presidential rescissions
would take effect automatically unless and until two-thirds of both Houses of Congress passed a disapproval bill. See id. Presidential power under enhanced rescission
authority of the Act becomes a factor after a president has signed a bill. See id at 97.
247 The Justices universally agreed that both Houses of Congress passed the Balanced Budget Act and that the President had signed that massive bill before exercising his cancellation power under the Act. See City of New York, 118 S. Ct. at 2102; see
id. at 2115 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Indeed, the majority, employing unambiguous nomenclature, indicated that the President had signed
the challenged provisions into law pursuant to Presentment Clause procedures. See
id. at 2102. For the Court, that recognition merely served as a startingpoint for the
Presentment Clause analysis. See i. at 2102-03. While the statutory cancellation unquestionably "occurs after the bill becomes a law," the dispositive issue for the Court
was whether the Constitution permits the unilateral repeal or amendment of admittedly duly enacted statutes. See id. at 2103. For the dissenters, that recognition
merely served as the virtual ending point for Presentment Clause analysis. See id. at
2115 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("'[T]he Court's problem
with the Act is not that it authorizes the President to veto parts of a bill and sign others into law, but rather that it authorizes him to 'cancel' - prevent from 'having legal force or effect' - certain parts of duly enacted statutes.'").

1999]

LINE-ITEM VETO

1663

tionally speaking. The timing of the post-signing mechanism was insufficient to save the statute from unconstitutionality. Properly refusing to elevate literal adherence to legal form over legal substance, the
Court determined that the Presentment Clause demands more than
merely a presidential signature on a bill.
The constitutional impediments to a statutory line-item veto
leave the proponents of such a mechanism with two alternatives.
First, as the Court suggested, an Article V constitutional amendment
is always available, though the procedural difficulties of formal
amendment generated in part the failed statutory effort.248 Additionally, Congress could develop the institutional resolve to make difficult budgetary choices.24 But this alternative is tautological for the
solution only identifies the problem; Congress. designed the superficial panacea of the line-item veto precisely to relieve the legislature of
such politically unpalatable choices.
Indeed, a tacit lesson from the
248

In pertinent part, Article V provides:

The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the several States, shall call
a Convention for proposing Amendments, which, in either Case, shall
be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when
ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several States, or by
Conventions in three fourths thereof....
U.S. CONST. art. V. Perhaps aware that acquiring supermajority approvals for a lineitem veto would pose an insuperable obstacle, Congress "stopped short of considering a constitutional amendment" to provide the President such power, but instead
chose "to address the line-item veto authority by statute." S. REP. No. 104-9, at 5
(1996).
24 SeeJames A. Thurber & Samantha L. Durst, The 1990 Budget Enforcement
Act:
The Decline of Congressional Accountability, in CONGRESs RECONSIDERED 392 (Lawrence
C. Dodd & Bruce I. Oppenheimer eds., 5th ed. 1993) ("While budgetary problems
continue to grow, Congress and the president blame the process and make themselves less accountable. Instead of forcing itself to pass a budget in a timely, fiscally
responsible manner, Congress continues to change the rules of the budget game.").
To their credit, some members of Congress voiced the view that the process panacea
of the Act could not compensate for difficult budgetary decisions. See S. REP. No.
104-9, at 876-78 (1996). SenatorJim Exon stated, "Facts are facts. Sooner or later,
we will have to look the deficit squarely in the eye and make some tough and painful
choices. Entitlement spending and tax expenditures are two we can no longer afford to avoid." Id, at 876. Similarly, Senator Barbara Boxer asserted, "[N]o
'expedited' or 'enhanced' process change will serve as a substitute for changing
spending priorities and making the tough choices. No amount of process change
will reduce the pain of tough budget cuts." Id. at 877.
250 The Act is another manifestation of a political phenomenon of the
1980s and
1990s, the "politics of avoidance." See TIMOTHYJ. PENNY & STEVEN E. SC-IER, PAYMENT
DUE 39 (1996). Congress retained the capacity to evade the strictures of a statute
supposedly created to diminish the exact type of political irresponsibility that evasion represents. See Devins, supra note 25, at 1624-26 (delineating the various methods by which a determined Congress might blunt a president's cancellation power
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Court's decision is that members of Congress, when constitutional
values are at stake, cannot resort to mere statute to insulate the instiThe
tution from the members' own existing political incentives.'
under the Act); see a/soJoyce & Reischauer, supra note 29, at 100-01 (describing how
Congress strategically might package and write legislation so as to neutralize or preempt a president's cancellation authority). In short, the Act is fiscally useless because the statute "is, in critical respects, nonbinding." Devins, supra note 25, at
1626. The ironically insidious aspect of the Act is that it "allows Congress to hide
behind obscurity. While it increases the President's responsibility, it decreases the
clarity with which Congress's decisions Can be seen. It is a technique of deception, a
device of opaqueness." Lessig, supranote 38, at 1664-65.
Congress earlier had polished its deficit-reduction deception techniques with
the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, known as GrammRudman-Hollings. See Pub. L. No. 99-177, 99 Stat. 1038 (1985) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of U.S.C.). Gramm-Rudman-Hollings "was the most
elaborate legal contraption produced by the politics of avoidance. It aimed to force
the president and Congress to face the deficit directly, or else suffer a Texas-chainsaw series of automatic budget cuts." PENNY & SCHIER, supra, at 39. Although the
legislation was meant to symbolize a realistic federal government finally addressing
the problem of the deficit, Gramm-Rudman-Hollings only "spawned budget gimmickry." See Devins, supra note 25, at 1616. Like the Act that would follow, GrammRudman-Hollings contained plenty of loopholes through which Congress and a
president might evade politically harsh outcomes. See PENNY & SCHIER, supra, at'40
(discussing the various loopholes available to both branches). Until 1990, "the
White House and Capitol Hill successfully avoided making tough choices while
claiming to hit the GRE! deficit-reduction targets. They did this by, well, lying." Id.
251 See Gerhardt, supra note 30, at 246 ("The attraction of the presidential
lineitem veto is not unlike that of term limits - both devices have been designed as
constraints on members of Congress otherwise determined not to be restrained
from being influenced by special interests in the legislative or reelection process.").
The problems of balancing the budget and reducing the deficit confront the structured incentives of elected officials; solving those problems would entail elected officials imposing immediate, politically unpopular, and concentrated costs in return
for hypothetical future dispersed benefits. See PENNY & SCHIER, supra note 250, at 3,
12. Politicians, therefore, naturally are averse to inflicting budgetary pain on politically potent constituencies for fear of eventual electoral retribution. See Jonathan
Rauch, Demosclerosis: The Disease That's Petrifying American Government, in ANNUAL
EDMONS: AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 1996/97 203 (Bruce Stinebrickner ed., 26th ed.
1996) ("Any politician, well-meaning or not, who tries to withdraw any group's program or subsidy, with justification or not, gets that group's fist in his face."). The
elected official's internal cost-benefit analysis is not complex: "A politician who challenges any existing lobby or program can expect all-out war - whereas a politician
who simply adds to the existing pile of programs collects campaign contributions,
support back home, and 'Honorary Dairyman of the Year' awards." Id at 202.
While these structured incentives militate against solving budgetary and deficit problems, elected officials are not necessarily disinterested in the efficient operation of
government or the elimination of wasteful programs. See Paul E. Peterson, The New
Politics of Deficits, in THE NEW DIREcnON IN AMERICAN PoLmcs 379, 397 (John E.
Chubb & Paul E. Peterson eds., 1985) (asserting that, while politicians denounce
deficits but protect their favored policy programs, analysts exaggerate the congressional interest in profligate spending). Members of Congress do not merely pursue
parochial interests for political profit at the expense of the interests of the national
public, and even legislation serving the interests of a smaller population still serves
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Court, as constitutional conscience, confirmed that an attempt to
dodge the Presentment Clause in order to serve desired policy goals
must eventually encounter fundamental-law principles.s
While a line-item veto theoretically is a convenient instrument
for producing more efficient government, City of New York highlights
that convenience and efficiency are not the ultimate constitutional
touchstones.2
Indeed, the Constitution, which diffuses power
among three branches and imposes redundancies such as bicameralism and presentment, is a tribute to the value of inefficiency toward
maintaining government stability and individual liberty. And yet, as
public disillusionment with government performance grows, the governmental impulse is to devise new statutory structures, such as the
Line Item Veto Act, to attack intractable problems with greater
quickness and efficiency.2" "Efficient government" and "effective
government," however, are not necessarily synonymous concepts.
The problems purportedly addressed by the Act ironically occurred not because public servants were inattentive to public preferences, but rather, because they were too efficiently attentive.2 A root
public values. See Sargentich, supra note 28, at 133-34 (pointing out that Congress
found agreement with President Clinton to trim the federal budget deficit and slow
theFrowth of federal spending).
See Spitzer, supra note 29, at 800 (describing that the Act's advocates tried to
dodge constitutional objections by passing a statute allowing only for post-signing
cancellation). While the inclusion of an expedited review provision in the Act would
seem to belie any claim that Congress sought to avoid a judgment on the Act's constitutionality, such a provision does not necessarily constitute positive commentary
on Congress. See Devins & Fitts, supra note 38, at 358-59. Expedited review provisions reflect the unfortunate desire of Congress to pass along its own responsibility
for initially reaching judgment on the constitutionality of its actions to the Court.
See i& ("Unwilling to invest significant institutional resources into determining
whether its most controversial laws are constitutional, Congress appears quite willing
to hand off this constitutional responsibility to the Court.").
"S The Court in Immigration and NaturalizationService v. Chadha articulated well
the primacy of constitutional values over arguments based on convenience and efficiency. See supra notes 82-85 and accompanying text.
See Stephen Stark, Too Presentative Government, in ANNUAL EDITIONS:
AMIcAN GovERNMENT 1996/97 116 (Bruce Stinebrickner ed., 26th ed. 1996)
("Rioters increasingly view their legislators almost as personal therapists .... If legislators now seem excessively parochial and preoccupied with day-to-day responsiveness, that is what they are hearing the public demand.").
bSee id. at 122. Stark states:
Polls tell us that among the major complaints about Congress are that
it doesn't represent the voters well enough and that it becomes
gridlocked - failing to solve the nation's lingering problems .... Yet
over the past two generations Congress has become far more representative and responsive than it used to be, and it now addresses issues
that previous legislatures never dreamed of.
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of the problems is located in the structure of public opinion, as
elected officials must grapple with a deeply ambivalent public that
places contradictory demands upon the modern welfare state and,
thus, upon its officials." 6 The ambivalent public generally supports
structural reforms, such as a line-item veto, while continuing to de-

mand the very policies that necessitate such reforms.257 It should not
be surprising, therefore, when Congress passes symbolic legislation
such as the Line Item Veto Act, which satisfies the public's reform
demands but leaves effectively intact the inviolability of programs
popular with that same public.
The underlying issue is whether representative and responsive
2
To
government is reconcilable with responsible government. 58
achieve that reconciliation, however, myopic process reforms never
adequately compensate for the failure of political will in both the
electorate and the elected. 2" Lack of political will necessitates resort
256

See Peterson, supra note 251, at 386. Insisting on more services at less cost,

"Americans endorse high levels of government protections and services, but at the
same time they consider government too big, too expensive, and too intrusive." Everett Caril Ladd, Public Opinion and the 'Congress Problem,' in READINGs IN AMERICAN
GOVERNMENT AND POLTICS 126 (Randall B. Ripley & Elliot E. Slotnick eds., 2nd ed.
1993). In the current climate of public opinion, "American voters and interest
groups seem to want to go to heaven without dying: they support spending for desired programs, but they resist increased taxes - thus mandating deficit financing."
Thurber & Durst, supra note 249, at S94. Also, because the public "assumes that half
of all spending is pure waste, they expect deficit reduction to be relatively painless."
PENNY & SCHIER, supra note 250, at 21. An impediment to true reform is that longterm problems, like imbalanced budgets and deficits, rarely register sufficiently with
the public. See id. at 69. Relatively few people "understand how entitlements
threaten fiscal stability and future generations' prosperity. Elected officeholders
concentrate on conditions between now and the next election. A short-term focus
gives a big advantage to entitlement claimants, with their massive electoral and lobbying resources." Id.
See Ladd, supra note 256, at 126.
2
The ulimate compatibility of responsiveness and responsibility remains a dilemma of democratic representation:
(R]epresentation is not just a matter of responding to specific interests
or citizens; the government must also respond to the collective needs
of a society, and here the success of individual interests reduces the
possibility of overall responsiveness. The very vibrancy and success of
contemporary groups help contribute to a society that finds it increasingly difficult to formulate solutions to complex policy questions.
Burdett A. Loomis & Allan J. Cigler, The ChangingNature of Interest Group Politics, in
AMERICAN PoLmcs: CLAssIc AND CONTEMPORARY READINGS 297 (Allan J. Cigler &
Burdett A. Loomis eds., 3d ed. 1995).
M
See Thurber & Durst, supra note 249, at 394 ("Neither the American electorate
nor its elected officials in the White House and on Capitol Hill have displayed the
political will necessary to make revenues match outlays."); see also Charles J. Whalen,
The Case Against a Balanced-Budget Amendment, in ANNUAL EDITIONS: AMERICAN
GOvERNMENT 1996/97 93 (Bruce Stinebrickner ed., 26th ed. 1996) ("No budget bal-
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to procedural machination. Justice Kennedy captured the fundamental point: "The Framers of the Constitution could not command
statesmanship."2" Now, the Court has struck down as unconstitutional the popular process reforms of state-imposed term limits"' and
the federal line-item veto.
Properly understood, however, the
Court's actions ultimately were not frustrative of popular will, but
rather, constitutional beacons for its reemergence.
Thomas C. Weisert

ance can ever be achieved without political will.").
Clinton v. City of New York, 118 S. CL 2091, 2110 (Kennedy,J., concurring).
26
See generally U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995).
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